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Abstract 
TOWARDS A RENEWED THEOLOGY OF PERSONAL AGENCY:
ORIGEN’S THEOLOGICAL VISION AND THE CHALLENGES OF  
FATALISM AND DETERMINISM
Rev. Bernard B. Poggi 
In our own contemporary context, there seems to be nothing more important than 
for a person to be able to speak about their achievements as being specifically their own. 
Yet it seems that due to two trends found in theology and science, it is increasingly 
difficult to talk about individual agency. The first trend which undercuts human agency is 
found in theological fatalism.1 We will look at the case of theological fatalism found in 
Islamic thought in the idea of qadar, the power of God by which everything is 
commanded.2 The second trend comes to us on account of science where there is an 
ideological claim3 being made called scientism. This ideology asserts that “science is the 
only way of knowing”4 and results in the rejection of all non-material categories; human 
actions are seen to be brought about (determined) simply as functions of their antecedent 
conditions in the material world and thusly become “incompatible with human 
freedom.”5 
In this paper, I seek to develop a renewed theology of personal agency in the face 
of theological fatalism and scientific determinism by drawing upon the work of Origen of 
Alexandria. This second-third century Father of the Church, offers a number of insights 
which are very pertinent in our contemporary context; in an age where individuality and 
self-realization are considered fundamental to the human experience. His assertions on 
human agency found in the first chapter of the third book of his De Principiis, summons 
its hearers “to live a good life and by every means avoid sin, for it assumes that they 
1 Theological fatalism is a system of thought rooted in how the divine attributes are operative in the created 
world due to the absolute potency found in God. Like fatalism in general, where every event or state of 
affairs that occurs, must occur, while the nonoccurrence of every event and state of affairs is likewise 
necessitated, theological fatalism asserts that the cause of God is operative at every moment in a way that 
impinges upon human freedom. 
2 Cf. Wan Fariza Alyati Wan Zakaria, "Qadar in Classical and Modern Islamic Discourses: Commending a 
Futuristic Perspective," International Journal of Islamic Thought 7 (2015): 40, accessed August 01, 2018, 
http://www.ukm.my/ijit/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/IJIT-Vol-7-June-2015_4_39-48.pdf. 
3 “Whenever one comes across the concept of ‘science,’ in the singular, being used…to support sweeping 
assertions to the effect that here, and here alone, is truth to be obtained, then one is in the presence neither 
of science, not of history, but of ideology.” Nicholas Lash, "Where Does The God Delusion Come From?" 
New Blackfriars 88, no. 1017 (2007): 517, accessed August 01, 2018, doi:10.1111/j.1741-
2005.2007.00172.x. 
4 Michael J. Dodds, O.P, Unlocking Divine Action: Contemporary Science and Thomas Aquinas 
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 51 foot note 26. 
5 Paul Russell and Oisín Deery, eds., The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings from the 
Contemporary Debates (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), 3. 
ii 
acknowledge that deeds worthy of praise or blame lie within our own power.”6 We will 
also draw on the vast work of St. Thomas Aquinas who helps situate a philosophical 
anthropology and an understanding of causality where humans are free in a world where 
God exists and is operative. He will assert and uphold the Catholic principle of 
cooperation between the human will and the divine will in defense of human freedom. To 
this end Aquinas states “that nothing which involves contradiction falls under the 
omnipotence of God.”7 
_____________________________________  __________ 
Prof. Thomas Cattoi, Ph.D. (Director)   Date 
  
                                                          
6 Origen, On First Principles, 3.1.1. 
7 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 25, a.4. 
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Introduction 
In our own contemporary context, there seems to be nothing more important than 
for a person to be able to speak about their achievements as being specifically their own. 
Yet it seems that due to two main trends found in theology and science, it is increasingly 
difficult to talk about personal agency. In theology the trend is theological fatalism, a 
system of thought rooted in how the divine attributes are operative in the created world 
due to the absolute potency found in God.1 In juxtaposition to fatalism in general, “a 
thesis that whatever happens must happen; every event or state of affairs that occurs, 
must occur, while the nonoccurrence of every event and state of affairs is likewise 
necessitated,”2 theological fatalism looks at causality of God in a way that leaves no 
room for human freedom. We will look at the case of theological fatalism found in 
Islamic thought in the idea of qadar, the power of God by which everything is 
commanded.3 As the sixth article of belief in Islam, the ascent to fate in qadar is 
operative through another related term called qada’. While qada’ expresses the “perfect 
commanding, decreeing, ruling, accomplishing”4 ability of God, qadar is not only the 
power which predestines all that is, but it also determines the nature of things created “the 
                                                          
1 My definition is derived from the explanation which Linda Zagzebski offers in “Recent work on Divine 
Foreknowledge and Freewill,” where she says: “Two important doctrines of traditional monotheistic 
theology threaten to lead to fatalism. One is the doctrine of infallible divine foreknowledge; the other is the 
doctrine of divine providence.” Linda Zagzebski, “Recent work on Divine Foreknowledge and Freewill,” in 
The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, ed. Robert Kane (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002), 45. 
2 Mark Bernstein, “Fatalism” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 65. 
3 Cf. Wan Fariza Alyati wan Zakaria, “Qadar in Classical and Modern Islamic Discourses: Commending a 
Futuristic Perspective” International Journal of Islamic Thought 7 (2015): 40. 
4 Zakaria, “Qadar in Classical and Modern Islamic Discourses,” 40. 
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inward reach of things, their latent potentialities or possibilities.”5 For Muslims, 
understanding fate correctly stems from believing in the oneness of God, and that God 
determines all things; for the determination of one’s destiny is unequivocally and 
theologically the domain of God.6   
In the context of serving Catholics from the Middle East, I have often encountered 
this way of thinking. These ideas and the terminology of qada’ and qadar have found 
their way into their everyday understanding of how the world works. I often hear at a 
funeral that it was “qadar” for an accident to have happened. Initially, ascribing 
something to God may possibly bring some comfort to those who have been stuck by 
such a ‘poor fate’, but in the long run, it makes it very hard for these people to seek and 
develop a profound personal relationship with a God who seemingly has brought about 
such tragedy into their lives. That is why it is necessary for us to rediscover a Christian 
sense of what human freedom means in the light of divine causality. 
The second trend which makes human causality exceedingly difficult to discuss in 
our current context comes from realm of science. For though there are wonderful 
advancements in modern science, our understanding of both human and divine causality 
                                                          
5 Ibid. 
6 Verses from the Qur’an that Muslims have drawn from in interpreting qadar are: “They said: Do we have 
any say in the matter? Muhammad, tell them: All matters belong to Allah. They try to bide within 
themselves what they do not reveal to you, saying: Had we had the matter in our hands, we would not have 
been slain there. Say: Even though you had been in your houses, those appointed to be slain would have 
been slain by your sworn enemies while you were in your beds.” (3:154) “We hold the store of everything 
and we send it down in an appointed measure.” (15:21) “Allah has set a measure for all things.” (65:2) 
“Surely We created everything by measure.” (54:49) “Then it is for Allah to have in error whom He will 
and to guide whom He pleases. He is the Mighty, the Wise”. (14:4) “Say: Allah! Owner of Sovereignty! 
You bestow sovereignty on whomever you will and you withdraw from whomever you will. In your Hand 
is all that is good. No doubt you have power to do everything”. (3:26) 
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seems to be shrinking because of the insistence in science on the acceptance of solely 
empirical quantities to explain all that is. In a sense, science makes an ideological claim7 
called scientism which asserts that “science is the only way of knowing.”8 As a result of 
this ideology, the world is seen solely in view of its material and measurable qualities, 
expressed in the term materialism. Any quality which is not measurable is “ignored 
methodologically but (also) denied metaphysically. The assumptions that science had 
used for studying he world became the ontological assertions about its nature.”9 The 
method by which science looks at the material world is through the process of 
reductionism, a practice of reducing things to their most basic parts, asserting that the 
“most basic parts of the world are also the most real.”10  
With things reduced down to purely material quantities, scientists look at the 
patterns in the world as a mathematical set of laws, or the laws of nature, that “are 
prescriptive of the present state of the universe.”11 This determinism renders the present 
state of the universe “as the effect of its anterior state and the cause of the one which is to 
follow.”12 Material causality was made possible by the work of Sir Isaac Newton who, 
                                                          
7 “Whenever one comes across the concept of ‘science,’ in the singular, being used…to support sweeping 
assertions to the effect that here, and here alone, is truth to be obtained, then one is in the presence neither 
of science, not of history, but of ideology.” Nicholas Lash, "Where Does The God Delusion Come From?" 
New Blackfriars 88, no. 1017 (2007): 517, accessed August 01, 2018, doi:10.1111/j.1741-
2005.2007.00172.x. 
8 Michael J. Dodds, O.P, Unlocking Divine Action: Contemporary Science and Thomas Aquinas 
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 51 foot note 26. 
9 Ibid., 50. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., 51. 
12 Pierre Simon Laplace, A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, trans. F. W. Truscott and F. L. Emory, ed. 
E. T. Bell (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1902), 4.  
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though himself included categories outside of the material world,13 offered an 
explanation, a physics, of causality showing how the world worked. “By the latter part of 
the eighteenth century, the explanatory success of Isaac Newton's physics in the natural 
world of material substances had discredited Descartes' concept14 of a non-material mind 
substance.”15 With the resulting rejection of all non-material categories, human actions 
were seen to be brought about simply as functions of their antecedent conditions in the 
material world and thusly became “incompatible with human freedom.”16 This tension 
between free will and scientific determinism is felt by those of us who live in a secular, 
enlightened, and science-oriented world.17  
In this paper, we will focus on two sources of that tension. The first portion looks 
at the work of Charles Darwin and the resulting biological determinism professed in Neo-
                                                          
13 In Isaac Newton’s Mathematical Principles he explains that the material world is not all that exists, 
rather his application of Divine causality and the role of God in the universe is quite inspirational and 
thought provoking. “This most beautiful system of the sun, plants, and comes, could only proceed form the 
counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being. And if the fixed starts are the centers of other 
like systems, these, being formed by the like wise counsel, must all be subject to the dominion of the 
One;…and lest the systems of the fixed stars should, by their gravity, fall on each other, he hath placed 
those systems at immense distances from one another. This Being governs all things, not as the soul of the 
world, but as the Lord over all…We know him only by his most wise and excellent contrivances of things, 
and final causes; we admire him for his perfections; but we reverence him and adore him on account of his 
dominion: for we adore him as his servants; and god without dominion, providence, and final causes, is 
nothing else but Fate and Nature. Blind metaphysical necessity, which is certainly the same always and 
everywhere, could produce no variety of things. All that diversity of natural things which we find suited to 
different times and places could arise from nothing but the will of a Being necessarily existing.” Dodds, 
Unlocking Divine Action, 54 foot note 40.  
14 The 17th Century French Philosopher, Rene Descartes proposed a Platonic structure of the to explain the 
human person in which human beings are comprised of two distinct substances. The first, res extensa, is the 
substance of the body which is comprised of material elements and is thereby subject to determinism. The 
other, res cogitans, he proposed to be the substance of the mind, a non-material substance which is not 
subject to determinism and from which we derive our free will and the responsibility for our actions. Cf. 
Gunther S. Stent, "Paradoxes of Free Will," Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, New 
Series 92, no. 6 (2002): 14, accessed August 01, 2018, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4144913. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Paul Russell and Oisín Deery, eds., The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings from the 
Contemporary Debates (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), 3. 
17 Cf. Stent, “Paradoxes of Free Will,” 110. 
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Darwinism. Darwin explained that through a process of living, called Natural Selection,18 
over a period of generations, a species of animal or plant would preserve favorable 
individual differences and variations while destroying those which are injurious to its 
existence. He not only spoke of the dynamic of natural selection, but of evolution of 
species as a function of natural selection. “This, then, is Darwinism - that the controlling 
factor or process in evolution is selective: the survival, in the struggle for existence, of 
those individuals which are best fitted to survive.”19  
Darwin asserted that variation and modification were induced within species 
through external sources, namely “by the environment…(such as) excess of food supply, 
although climate, and other impinging circumstances, are (also) potent causes of 
modification.”20 Regarding internal sources of continuity within generations, Darwin was 
unsure, but he went out on the proverbial limb stating “(h)ypotheses may often be of 
service to science, when they involve a certain portion of incompleteness, and even of 
error.' Under this point of view, I venture to advance the hypothesis of 
                                                          
18 “Darwin… saw that all forms of life vary; he perceived that there must be a fierce struggle for place or 
existence amongst the individuals of the rapidly succeeding generations. This variation and struggle are 
particularly apparent in cultivated plants; and Darwin saw that the gardener selects the best, and thereby 
"improves" the breed. "Can it, then, be thought improbable," says Darwin, "seeing that variations useful to 
man have undoubtedly occurred, that other variations useful in some way to each being in the great and 
complex battle of life, should occur in the course of many successive generations? If such do occur, can we 
doubt (remembering that many more individuals are born than can possibly survive) that individuals having 
any advantage, however slight, over others, would have the best chance of surviving and of procreating 
their kind?" "This preservation of favorable individual differences and variations, and the destruction of 
those which are injurious, I have called Natural Selection, or the Survival of the Fittest.” Liberty Hyde 
Bailey, "Neo-Lamarckism and Neo-Darwinism," The American Naturalist 28, no. 332 (1894): 662, 
accessed August 01, 2018, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2452518. 
19 Ibid., 662-663. 
20 Ibid. 
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Pangenesis.”21 Pangenesis built on the work of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck in one of the 
popular theories of the time called "blending inheritance" which proposed that offspring 
were “merely an average between the two different characteristics of their parents.”22 
In the early 20th Century, the rediscovery of Father Gregor Mendel’s work and the 
beginnings of genetics appeared to deal a blow to the theory of Darwin. “Mendelian traits 
seemed to be inherited as discrete units, which would imply the impossibility of gradual 
evolutionary change.”23 Rather than rejecting the theory of Darwin, scientists went to 
remove the Lamarkian influence of “blending inheritance” from Darwin’s theory 
eventually incorporating Mendilian genetics.24 The physiologist George Romanes called 
this new theory neo-Darwinism (later termed, modern synthesis), which despite having 
such directly religious origins,25 developed into a way of explaining the living world 
without any reference to a supernatural creator, moreover without any real reference to 
causality (except that of chance), purpose, or intentionality at all.26 Charles De Konick 
notes that “(e)ver since Darwin, the opinion remains prevalent that the notion of purpose 
                                                          
21 Charles Darwin, The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication, vol. 2 (London, England: 
John R. Murray, 1868), 357. 
22 Massimo Pigliucci and Gerd B. Müller, “Elements of an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis,” 4, accessed 
August 01, 2018, 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/258235989_Elements_of_an_extended_evolutionary_synthesis. 
23 Ibid., 5. 
24 Ibid., 5-6. 
25 Cf. Richard England, "Natural Selection, Teleology, and the Logos: From Darwin to the Oxford Neo-
Darwinists, 1859-1909," Osiris 16 (2001), accessed August 01, 2018, https://www.jstor.org/stable/301989. 
26 According to neo-Darwinism: “spontaneous variations occur through genetic change, and new traits are 
passed on through genetic inheritance. Contrary to Darwin’s instincts, spontaneous changes are now 
usually attributed to chance, while the preservation of characteristics both through individual inheritance 
and through the process of natural selection is seen as part of the lawful and stable structure of nature.” 
Dodds, Unlocking Divine Action, 79. 
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in nature in unscientific and unnecessary.”27 Specifically speaking, human freedom is 
trumped by the determinism presented in these biological and evolutionary systems; our 
current state of being is a consequence of the past, our decisions and choices are 
necessitated by our genetic makeup, and on the evolutionary scale of things, the choices I 
make today don’t make much of a difference at all.28 Our actions “are the consequences 
of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on 
before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the 
consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us.”29 
The second portion looks at the recent developments in the field of neuroscience, 
“a multidisciplinary branch of biology that combines physiology, anatomy, molecular 
biology, developmental biology, cytology, mathematical modeling and psychology to 
understand the fundamental and emergent properties of neurons and neural circuits.”30 
This study seeks to look at the complex process of learning, memory, behavior, 
perception and consciousness as a function of the activity of the brain. However, 
scientists in this realm of study also largely ascribe to the ideal of scientism which we 
described earlier and so for them “mental phenomena, including willing, (are) nothing 
other than ordinary bodily functions…(and thereby are) governed by determinism.”31  
                                                          
27 Charles De Koninck, The Hollow Universe (London, England: Oxford University Press, 1960), 97. 
28 Dodds, Unlocking Divine Action, 85. 
29 Robin Attfield, "Darwins Doubt, Non-deterministic Darwinism and the Cognitive Science of Religion," 
Philosophy 85, no. 334 (2010): 470, accessed August 01, 2018, doi:10.1017/s0031819110000422.  
30 Wikipedia, "Neuroscience," Wikimedia, 2018, accessed August 01, 2018, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience. 
31 Stent, “Paradoxes of Free Will,” 12. 
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In 1990, advancements in the field brought about the 'Decade of the Brain'32 as 
there were considerable studies done on “our understanding the biological bases of 
thoughts and feelings.”33 Probably the most influential among these studies was one done 
by the neuroscientist Benjamin Libet, who in 1983 published his research34 which looked 
at brain wave patterns, after having removed constraints on freedom of action, where 
subjects performed a simple flick of the wrist at any time they felt an urge to do so. The 
study concluded that the effect of conscious (willful) action is not then on initiation of 
cerebral activity (i.e. the thought process which goes into an action) but rather on what 
Libet called “veto possibility”35 or the ability of the human person to stop him/her self 
from doing something. To this end, he noted that there was only room for a so called 
“free won’t”36 where subjects were able to exert a veto of an action which had already 
been prepared in the brain within the interval of 100 to 200 milliseconds before the 
moment of action. The resulting formulation of this research was that “for the control of 
movements we have free will but for the initiation of movements or actions we do not 
have free will.”37 
As a result, experts in the field of neuroscience have proclaimed ““free will” is 
not the defining feature of humanness, modern neuroscience implies, but is rather an 
                                                          
32 Library of Congress, "Decade of the Brain Home Page," Library of Congress, accessed August 01, 2018, 
http://www.loc.gov/loc/brain/. 
33 Stent, “Paradoxes of Free Will,” 12. 
34 Cf. Benjamin Libet, “Time of Conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity 
(readiness-protentional): the unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act” in Brain 106 (1983): 623-642. 
35 Ibid., 641. 
36 Andrea Lavazza, “Advances in Pediatrics,” 2016, accessed August 28, 2018, 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4887467/. 
37 Libet, “Time of Conscious intention to act,” 560. 
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illusion that endures only because biochemical complexity conceals the mechanisms of 
decision making.”38 These implications would go to undermine how intentionality was 
understood. In a sense, the brain becomes its own boss and the human person simply a 
conduit to the functions of cerebral processes.  
In this paper, I seek to develop a renewed theology of personal agency in the face 
of theological fatalism and scientific determinism by drawing upon the work of Origen of 
Alexandria. This second-third century Father of the Church offers a number of insights 
which are very pertinent in our contemporary context; in an age when individuality and 
self-realization are considered fundamental to the human experience. His assertions on 
human agency, found in the first chapter of the third book of his De Principiis, summons 
its hearers “to live a good life and by every means avoid sin, for it assumes that they 
acknowledge that deeds worthy of praise or blame lie within our own power.”39 We will 
also draw on the vast work of Aquinas on philosophical anthropology and causality in 
order for us to understand how it is that humans are free in a world where God exists and 
is operative. He will assert and uphold the Catholic principle of cooperation between the 
human will and the divine will in defense of human freedom. To this end Aquinas asserts 
“that nothing which involves contradiction falls under the omnipotence of God.”40 In this 
work, it is not my intent to venture into the very related topic of moral responsibility, as 
that would be the domain of moral theologians, rather I seek to look at this topic from a 
                                                          
38 Tom Siegfried, “The Decider” in Science News 174 (2008): 28. 
39 Origen, On First Principles, 3.1.1. 
40 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 25, a.4. 
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dogmatic point of view; answering the question, why is it necessary for us to believe that 
a person is fundamentally free? 
Chapter 1: The Philosophical Basis of Freedom of Will 
To be able to shed some light on the issue, we have to understand what it means 
to will something. “Willing is essentially, causality though intention.”41 When God wills, 
his potency as cause (described as omnipotence) and his potency of intentionality or 
knowing (described in the term omniscience) are absolute.42 To speak of human free will, 
we consider whether or not a person has the capacity to choose their own course of 
action. Robert Kane, the distinguished American philosopher, defines free will as “the 
power of agents to be the ultimate creators (or originators) and sustainers of their own 
ends and purposes.”43 Kane notes that it is important also to distinguish between free will 
                                                          
41 Keith Ward, Divine Action: Examining God's Role in an Open and Emergent Universe (Philadelphia, 
PA: Templeton Foundation Press, 2007), 250. 
42 This definition of omnipotence and omniscience is derived from Storrs McCall’s analysis in his essay 
“The supervenience of truth: freewill and omniscience” where he states: “Augustine's and Aquinas' 
conception of God is that he stands outside time rather than within it, and cognizes the world sub specie 
aeternitatis, not in a successive manner from one instant to another. The atemporal omniscience of God 
accords with the tenseless, temporally definite propositions that are the object of that knowledge. Thus if 
God is omniscient God knows, not the truth of the future-tense proposition 'The sun will rise in 1000 years', 
but (assuming it is true) 'The sun rises (tenselessly) on Oct 28, 3010'. To say that God is omniscient is to 
say that God knows of every true proposition that it is true, and of every false proposition that it is false.” 
Storrs McCall, "The Supervenience of Truth: Freewill and Omniscience," Analysis 71, no. 3 (2011): 503, 
accessed August 01, 2018, doi:10.1093/analys/anr051. However, there are alternative views on what the 
omnipotence and omniscience mean. According to Donald H. Wacome in his essay “Divine Omniscience 
and Human Freedom” he states that “the doctrine of divine omniscience does not imply that God knows 
absolutely everything, but that God's omniscience is a matter of his knowing what it is possible for him to 
know, prompts us to ask whether the kinds of knowledge traditionally attributed to God are kinds of 
knowledge it is possible for him to have.” Donald H. Wacome, "Divine Omniscience and Human 
Freedom," Divine Omniscience & Free Will, , accessed August 01, 2018, 
http://www.tyler.net/triddorus/omniscience.html. For more detailed analysis, see the conclusion. 
43 Robert Kane, "Free Will and Responsibility: Ancient Dispute, New Themes," The Journal of Ethics 4, 
no. 4 (2000): 315, accessed August 01, 2018, https://www.jstor.org/stable/25115654. 
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and free actions, where as freedom in the will has to do with the being the source of ones 
own purposes, to “act freely is be unhindered in the pursuit of your purposes”44 
Historical Survey on Freedom of Will  
The idea of human freedom is something that has been grappled with for some 
time. Despite not overtly discussing freedom of will, Plato in The Republic says we are 
free to choose in this life and in our next also in all of its details,45 yet he never explains 
the dynamic of how that is possible nor what is involved in a free choice. Aristotle, his 
student, on the other hand offers an analysis of causality and its interaction with human 
action. In Book II of the Physics, he divides causality into three groups:46 those which are 
rooted in necessity and always happen in the same way, the second which occur for the 
most part “whether intended by nature or by human free will, are normally realized, but 
sometimes fail to occur”47 and the third group which is rooted in the causality of chance. 
He will explain chance events as events where the "incidental cause is indeterminable”48 
and to distinguish the second group from the third, events which occur ‘for the most part’ 
are events which stem from deliberate intentionality which are attributable to some cause 
                                                          
44 Ibid. 
45 Plato, Myth of Er: “You are free to choose and will be held responsible for your choice. Let not the first 
choose carelessly, nor the last give up hope. Even the last soul to pick a cosmic contract will find a 
tolerable life lying here, if he chooses with intelligence.” Elizabeth Carman, "Plato's Myth of Er," Cosmic 
Cradle, July 04, 2014, accessed August 01, 2018, http://cosmiccradle.com/plato/. 
46 Aristotle, Physics, 2.2: “First then we observe that some things always come to pass in the same way, and 
others for the most part. It is clearly of neither of these that chance is said to be the cause, nor can the 'effect 
of chance' be identified with any of the things that come to pass by necessity and always, or for the most 
part. But as there is a third class of events besides these two-events which all say are 'by chance'-it is plain 
that there is such a thing as chance and spontaneity.” "The Internet Classics Archive | Physics by Aristotle," 
accessed August 01, 2018, http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.2.ii.html. 
47 Dodds, Unlocking Divine Action, 35. 
48 Aristotle, Physics, 2.5 
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such as nature or choice.49 This second class of causality is of significant importance to 
our work here.   
Aristotle speaks about moral responsibility and appropriates praise or blame to an 
agent for an action which he/she has undertaken.50 He notes that the extent to which the 
agent becomes blameworthy is not a matter of science but rather a matter of perception,51 
for there are certain criteria which must be met in order for a person to ascribe 
responsibility to their own actions. The deliberative power is one of those necessary 
criteria; where the agent deliberates “about things that are in our power and can be 
done,”52 “not about ends but about means”53 and then the agent chooses that which he/she 
has deliberated about. He will say “it is that which has been decided upon as a result of 
deliberation that is the object of choice.”54 In chapter 4 of the same book, Aristotle goes 
to show that in an agent's choice one is able to discern the agent’s conception of what is 
good.  
                                                          
49 On a technical note, while Dodds in Unlocking Divine Action applies the notion of human free will to 
Aristotle’s second cause, Michael Frede in his book A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought 
notes that Aristotle never fully develops this ‘second class of causality’ in terms of freedom of will and 
rather simply speaks of choice. I think the point is valid and thereby I will hold to the terminology of choice 
when dealing with Aristotle’s work, the main point for us is that we are able to apply the constituent parts 
of his analysis to what goes into a deliberate choice, later to be developed as willful human action. Cf. 
Michael Frede and A. A. Long, Free Will - Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2012). 
50 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 2.9 “The man, however, who deviates little from goodness is not blamed, 
whether he do so in the direction of the more or of the less, but only the man who deviates more widely; for 
he does not fail to be noticed. But up to what point and to what extent a man must deviate before he 
becomes blameworthy it is not easy to determine by reasoning, any more than anything else that is 
perceived by the senses; such things depend on particular facts, and the decision rests with perception.” 
51 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 3.3.17. 
52 Ibid., 3.3. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
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He also explains that another necessary constituent of an action, in order to have 
moral value, is that it must be voluntary. In that, a voluntary action must have two 
distinctive features, the first is control: “we are masters of our actions from the beginning 
right to the end, if we know the particular facts, but though we control the beginning of 
our states of character the gradual progress is not obvious any more than it is in illnesses; 
because it was in our power, however, to act in this way or not in this way, therefore the 
states are voluntary.”55 Here it is interesting that Aristotle makes the distinction between 
being in control at the outset of an action and losing control along the way. As in many of 
our human actions, it seems Aristotle acknowledges that so long as the first move was the 
product of our choice, the resulting effects of our actions are tied to the causality of our 
first move, even if the end was not intended. Perfect knowledge then does not define a 
lack of control; rather Aristotle focuses more on the factors which compel an agent by 
external forces. We will discuss these factors of compulsion at greater length when we 
discuss fatalism. However, for us to discount knowledge completely in its role on choice 
would be misguided, for the second feature of voluntary action is Aristotle's proposition 
of an epistemic condition, that of awareness. To this end, he states: “(s)ince that which is 
done under compulsion or by reason of ignorance is involuntary, the voluntary would 
seem to be that of which the moving principle is in the agent himself, he being aware of 
the particular circumstances of the action.”56 
                                                          
55 Ibid., 3.5. 
56 Ibid., 3.1. 
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To recount then, for an action to be considered as stemming from the causality of 
choice there are two constituents which must be present: the first is that the choice to act 
must be rooted in deliberation. The deliberation must consist of things which are in our 
power and of the means by which they will take place. The second is that the action must 
be voluntary, stemming from things which are within our control (not compulsory) and of 
which we have an awareness of the circumstances which surround the action. We began 
our discussion on the work of Aristotle by speaking about causality where he classifies 
actions caused by choice as normally realized but sometimes failing to occur. These 
actions can be classified as contingent upon the choice of the actor and thereby according 
to his worldview, these actions fail to fulfill the definition of “antecedent conditions” 
necessary for them to be considered deterministic in the strict sense. We also have seen 
that when we deliberate about actions which are in our power and about how (or the 
means by which) they will come to be, we can attribute causality to the intentionality of 
the actor. We have further established that for an action to be voluntary, it must be a 
function of the control of the actor and within his/her awareness. All these elements are 
necessary for an action to be attributed to the willful and free action of the agent, yet at 
the same time, "Aristotle describes deliberation as the origin of choice; and choice as the 
origin of deliberate action; and deliberate action as the origin of events. So although 
initially we might be tempted to think of an origin as something that operates outside of 
any preceding causal sequence, Aristotle himself does not conceive of something's origin 
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as coming to be or existing in this way.”57 This would then classify Aristotle’s worldview 
as deterministic.  
Aristotle also analyzes fatalistic systems of thought in his work On Interpretation 
9 where he appeals to reason in showing why future things cannot be determined in a way 
that fulfills fatalism. He provides us with the following analogy: 
A sea-fight must either take place to-morrow or not, but it is not necessary that it should 
take place to-morrow, neither is it necessary that it should not take place, yet it is 
necessary that it either should or should not take place to-morrow. Since propositions 
correspond with facts, it is evident that when in future events there is a real alternative, 
and a potentiality in contrary directions, the corresponding affirmation and denial have 
the same character. 58 
In this analogy, he is explicit in rejecting the fate of things which have not yet 
come to pass. By its determination of things which have not yet come into being, fate 
renders “our deliberations and decisions to be causally ineffective and make no difference 
to the course of events.”59 We have seen how it is that Aristotle applies the concepts of 
deliberation, control, and choice as antecedent causes to deliberate human action, therein 
we are certain that he rejected the proposition of fate. 
It will be in later stoic literature where we encounter the most radical systems of 
fatalism found in philosophical thought. Sophie Botros comments that "the early stoics 
                                                          
57 Jennifer Daigle, "Aristotle, Determinism, and Moral Responsibility," (M.A. thesis, Georgia State 
University, 2015), 5, accessed August 01, 2018, https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/176.  
58 Aristotle will continue his analysis in On Interpretation 9 of the sea battle by rejecting the proposition 
that future events are necessary determined: “This is the case with regard to that which is not always 
existent or not always nonexistent. One of the two propositions in such instances must be true and the other 
false, but we cannot say determinately that this or that is false, but must leave the alternative undecided. 
One may indeed be more likely to be true than the other, but it cannot be either actually true or actually 
false.” Aristotle, De Interpretatione¸9. 
59 Paul Russell, “Compatibilist-Fatalism: Finitude, Pessimism and the Limits of Free Will” in The 
Philosophy of Free Will, Paul Russell and Oisín Deery, eds., 451. 
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were… extreme determinists"60 who applied the presuppositions of the necessity of the 
causality of every event,61 and of the regularity of outcomes to the same antecedent 
causes.62 The stoics will also consider that when the cause of things is a divine one, the 
outcomes of future events can be known, not as in predictability, but rather in “the 
genesis of early stoic fatalism.”63 By doing so, the stoics reject the Aristotelian idea that 
future events are undetermined.64 Let us take a look at some of those stoic thinkers. 
Zeno offers the proposition that the “material world is itself the result produced 
from the operation of two principles. The active principle is God, and the passive is 
matter.”65 In usual Stoic fashion Zeno asserts god as a force which permeates the entirety 
of the universe66 and that the entire cosmos is one.67 From those two assertions we arrive 
to the stoic idea of pantheism where everything is god. The repercussion of this gnostic 
                                                          
60 Sophie Botros, “Causality, Fatalism and Early Stoic Philosophy” Phronesis 30, no. 3 (1985): 276. 
61 Here Botros paraphrases from Alexander of Aphrodisias’ On Fate 22 where he states: “there is an 
impossibility in things turning out in a certain manner at one moment and not so at another, in as much as 
all the same contingencies arise concerning the cause and that of which it is the cause... If (things could 
turn out in different ways in different circumstances) ... then there (would be) motion without cause.” 
Botros, “Causality, Fatalism and Early Stoic Philosophy,” 276. 
62 Cf. Ibid. 
63 Ibid., 277. 
64 For us to claim that all stoic thinkers were radical determinists would be a fallacy. Epicurius who 
introduces the idea of atomic swerve “as a random, uncaused event, (and in doing so) he offers a solution to 
the problem of freewill. Unlike Aristotle, he fully appreciated that there was a problem. He believed in free 
will, because it seemed to him manifestly clear that men could originate action, but he could not, like 
Aristotle, regard this as the end of the matter.” Pamela Huby, “The First Discovery of the Freewill 
Problem” in Philosophy 42, no. 162 (1967): 358. We will see another example with Lucretius in the section 
on Indeterminism. 
65 Alfred Pearson, The Fragments of Zeno & Cleanthes with Introduction & Explanatory Notes (London, 
England: C.J. Clay & Sons, 1891), 10-11. 
66 Cf. Pearson, The Fragments of Zeno & Cleanthes, 11. 
67A. A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1986), 111. 
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worldview meant that knowledge and goodness went hand in hand to say that "the good 
man is wise and the bad is ignorant; from knowledge right action follows necessarily."68 
In the work of Chrysippus (280-204 B.C.), we again see that the Stoic idea of 
pantheism, but this time with the clear assertion of fate regarding future events. 
According to Cicero, Chrysippus “calls the world itself a god, and also the all-pervading 
world-soul, and again the guiding principle of that soul, which operates in the intellect 
and reason, and the common and all-embracing nature of things; beside this, the fire that I 
previously termed aether; and also the power of Fate, and the Necessity that governs 
future events.”69 Chrysippus defined fate “as a natural ordering of all things so that one 
follows another eternally and decays in its turn in an unalterable concatenation of 
events.”70 
Seneca will later add that the causal chain set into motion at once by the creator, 
will always be set and will always be obeyed.71 With this then we can say that everything 
had become subject to the laws of fate, it becomes the cause which governs the universe 
and all its actions each according to its nature. As we will see with Origen, he has the 
hard work of overcoming these fatalistic implications in his application of these 
philosophical principles to the Christian faith in light of scripture. 
                                                          
68 Ibid. 
69 Cicero, De natura deorum, 1.39 
70 Huby, “The First Discovery of the Freewill Problem,” 360. 
71 Seneca, On Providence 5.8: “One unchangeable course bears along the affairs of men and gods alike. 
Although the great creator and ruler of the universe himself wrote the decrees of Fate, yet he follows them. 
He obeys forever, he decreed but once.” 
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A later Philosopher, Lucretius who was an epicurean atomist of the first century 
wrote about causality in his work De Rerum Natura. In contrast to determinism and the 
chain of causality, he offers an explanation on how atomic collisions can occur in the first 
place, not due to causal forces as seen in determinacy, but in an indeterminant way, 
brought about by the unpredictable ‘swerve’ in atomic motion.72 These unpredictable 
movements in atoms not only bring about actions which are caused in an undetermined 
manner but they also the fundament of freedom in the human person, beginning in the 
will and passing through the rest of the body. It is important to note that “indeterminism 
is a technical term that merely precludes deterministic causation, not causation 
altogether.”73  
Seeing that the philosophical definitions of determinism and indeterminism are 
not set in stone, depending on how one defines the terms, one is able to situate the 
philosopher’s work in different categories. Sarah Broadie’s work is one such example, for 
she defines determinism as the “absolute claim that everything is necessary or 
necessitated.”74 In this light, she considers Aristotle not in the camp of determinism, but 
rather indeterminism. Broadie points out that in Metaphysics 6, Aristotle accounts for 
why the coincidental fails to be a proper object of scientific inquiry. She notes that the 
philosopher answers that the coincidental has no explanation. This should not be 
                                                          
72 Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, 73-74: “Once again, if every motion is always linked on, and the new 
always arises from the old in order determined, nor by swerving do the first-beginnings make a certain start 
of movement to break through the decrees of fate, that cause may not follow cause from infinite time; 
whence comes this free will for living things all over the earth…without doubt it is his own will which 
gives to each one a start for this movement, and from the will the motions pass flooding through the limbs.” 
73 Robert Kane, “Some Neglected Pathways in the Free Will Labyrinth” in The Oxford Handbook, 421. 
74 Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, 158. 
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understood as being that the coincidental lacks a cause, but that its occurrence lacks an 
explanation. This would be commensurate with indeterminacy.  
Returning to Aristotle's analysis, we must recall that the causality of chance is not 
applicable to moral action for it does not fulfill the constituent of deliberation or 
knowledge. It is hard to discuss freedom considering indeterminacy because the causality 
is not as clear, although Lucretius posits freedom of the agent in the undetermined 
system. Others will say that “if free will is not compatible with determinism, it does not 
seem to be compatible with indeterminism either. An event that is undetermined might 
occur or not occur, given the entire past. So whether or not it actually occurs…would 
seem to be a matter of chance. But chance events are not under the control of anything, 
hence not under the control of an agent.”75 
Chapter 2: The Christian Understanding of Freedom of Will 
Seeing that we will begin our formulation of the Christian understanding of 
human freedom from Origen, it is necessary that we take a moment to describe the world 
of thought which he was operating in. The main idea which Gnosticism is known for, has 
to do with a static dualism between the spiritual and the material worlds. Jonas calls this 
the “cardinal feature of Gnostic thought.”76 The divine realm is separated from the 
material realm in that the divine is not the source of the material, rather there is an 
antithetical relation between the two realms. 
                                                          
75 Robert Kane, “Some Neglected Pathways in the Free Will Labyrinth” in The Oxford Handbook, 414-415. 
76 Hans Jonas, The Gnostic Religion: The Message of the Alien God and the Beginnings of Christianity 
(Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2001), 42. 
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We can see an example of this in the gnostic Hymn of the Great Pearl where 
Egypt is “a symbol for the material world…the world of matter, the world of ignorance 
and of perverse religion.”77 In the text, the stranger goes out from the home of his family 
and removes his royal robes to put on the garment of the Egyptians. In order for him to be 
accepted by the people of this material world he must “clothe himself in the affliction of 
the worlds in order to exhaust the powers of the world.”78 Though he has put on these 
garments, the Egyptians realize that there is still something different about the stranger 
and so they make every attempt to incorporate him in their ways. To this end, the 
narrative offers that the Egyptians “succeed precisely for the reason that his concealment 
succeeded: namely, his having a body.”79 Seemingly, the power of the material world is a 
great threat to the spiritual world. 
The cosmological and anthropological implications of this worldview are 
interesting. Jonas notes that Gnostics transposed the names for the one and supreme God 
found in Judaism into the proper names of the Archons (inferior demonic beings) who 
collectively rule over the world in what he calls a “pejorative revaluation”80 of the Jewish 
belief. These Archons rule over the world with the tyranny of “universal Fate”81 which is 
applied in the law of nature and which aims at the enslavement of man. The goal of each 
Archon is to prevent residents of their spheres from escaping the world and returning to 
God. This is done through bodily control, for through the body and the soul humanity is 
                                                          
77 Ibid.,118. 
78 Ibid.,119. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid., 43. 
81 Ibid. 
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part of the world and subjected to the same universal Fate. “Enclosed in the soul is the 
spirit…a portion of the divine substance from beyond which has fallen into the world; 
and the Archons created man for the express purpose of keeping it captive there.”82  
According to this view, in order for humanity to attain salvation, or the release of 
the inner person from the bonds of the world, a person is to return to his/her native realm 
of light. Humanity must know “about the transmundane God and about himself, that is, 
about his divine origin as well as his present situation and accordingly also the natural of 
the world which determines this situation.”83 The pneumatics, who are the possessors of 
knowledge, are illuminated not only in mind but in action. The quagmire to human 
freedom rests in the fact that the illumination (or the lack thereof) is a product of the 
nature of the person and not something that the person can control.  
The classification of a group of people as pneumatics is indicative of the 
prevailing idea of classes of people which was present in Gnostic thought; in this 
humanity is born with a pre-determined or “invariable nature.”84 This doctrine, found in 
many of the different gnostic schools, has been preserved in the writings of the early 
fathers of the Church, like Irenaeus and Origen. Irenaeus remarks that in this doctrine, the 
Gnostics "declare that it is not because of their works but rather because they are spiritual 
by nature that they are absolutely and, in every way, saved.”85 In this kind of a world 
view a complete ascent to the determination of one’s nature, brought about a natural 
                                                          
82 Ibid., 44. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid., 271. 
85 Winrich Alfried Löhr, "Gnostic Determinism Reconsidered," Vigiliae Christianae 46, no. 4 (1992): 382, 
accessed August 01, 2018, doi:10.1163/157007292x00188. 
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reaction: one was to take full advantage of the incorruptible nature which they had 
received though given through a life of excess (libertinism) and the other was to try as 
much as possible to avoid encountering the material world by living a life of strict 
temperance (ascetism). Hans Jonas explains that the two reactions have a common root; 
for libertinism “repudiates allegiance to nature through excess, the other (asceticism) 
through abstention.”86  
Ascetism here should not be understood as a product of virtue87 as we understand 
it today. Virtue is tied to human freedom. Still, we find this notion of ascetism in many of 
various gnostic schools and the founders who posited their ideals including, Mani, 
Valentinus and Marcion. 
Marcion shows with abundant clarity: his moral argument…is based entirely on the 
theme of contempt and enmity toward the world and does not entrust to the abstention 
from its works the task of perfecting the subject. The abstention is essentially a matter of 
rejection and thus is as much an expression of the revolt against the creator as is the 
libertine indulgence.88 
The categories which we have discussed earlier regarding fatalism have helped us to gain 
an understanding of the various ideas which we will discuss in this next section, the 
Christian idea of free will. What I would like to underline is the fact that early 
Christianity saw itself a product of all we have considered. In fact, it was not until the 
sixth century when there was the definitive closure and condemnation of the 
philosophical schools by the Emperor Justinian in 529 AD. It would be vitally necessary 
                                                          
86 Jonas, The Gnostic Religion, 274. 
87 Jonas explains that “Plotinus’ critique implied moral indifference in the Gnostics, that is not only the 
absence of a doctrine of virtue but also the disregard of moral restraints in real life.” Ibid., 270. 
88 Ibid., 275. 
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for Christianity to develop a method of explaining how to maintain human freedom in 
light of these elements and how to do so in a manner that was true to scripture and to the 
common faith of the Church. The incarnation would be the key feature in this all, for in 
overcoming the static dualism presented in Gnostic thought, between the spiritual world 
and the material world, the early Church would need to consider how it is that God has 
come into our realm. 
Origen of Alexandria 
Origen’s view on philosophy was positive, for him “being a Christian 
philosopher, both fully Christian and fully philosopher, …is perfectly possible and 
consistent.”89 To this end, Origen knew philosophy and to a large extent he worked to 
formulate a consistent Christian philosophical belief. He was born in the late second 
century (185/186), to a father who was reportedly decapitated in martyrdom for 
professing the Christian faith. This tragedy had a profound impact on his entire family 
not only emotionally but also financially as “the whole patrimony of those executed was 
confiscated to the treasury.”90 As the eldest of seven children, he had the duty of working 
to provide in place of his father, yet he seemed to have a profound desire to follow in his 
father’s footsteps, in gaining the crown of martyrdom. “Despite his eagerness for the 
honor of martyrdom, he was denied it by the very law that put his students of the higher 
                                                          
89 Ilaria Ramelli, "Origen, Patristic Philosophy, and Christian Platonism Re-Thinking the Christianization 
of Hellenism," Vigiliae Christianae 63, no. 3 (2009): 220, accessed August 01, 2018, 
doi:10.1163/157007208x377292.  
90 John Anthony McGuckin, ed., The Westminster Handbook to Origen (Louisville, KY: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 2004), 3. 
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classes to death.”91 Assuredly, this would be one of the reasons why he held such a 
staunch criticism of the Gnostic doctrine of natures and the predestination of man, which 
will be developed later in this chapter. Having been tortured later in life, he never was 
martyred; he was technically a confessor, yet both titles of sanctity remain missing from 
his memory, even into our current day for his teaching was the object of numerous 
condemnations during his life92 and well after.93 
He is a controversial figure in history because he is known for a tendency to allow 
too much autonomy to the human person and the choices which he/she makes because the 
person’s choices appear to transcend the boundaries of nature (because the notion of 
human nature is not yet really developed).94 Amongst those who would state that 
                                                          
91 Ibid. 
92 In Cyril C. Richardson’s Condemnation of Origen he states that some of the reasons Origen faces 
condemnation during his life is not only the fact that he had himself castrated, but also that he had 
extensive philosophical pursuits which had been condemned, to this end he writes: “The truth of the 
situation seems to be that the rapid expansion of Christianity had stimulated the Graeco-Roman world to its 
last great effort to dominate the religious life of cultivated society with a refined Neo-Platonism. The effect 
of this upon the Christian church was a deep and unyielding aversion from all heathen philosophy. 
Tertullian, the older contemporary of Origen, represents this school: the philosophers to him are the arch-
heretics…Origen, on the other hand, attempted a compromise. He grasped the fact that Christianity and 
philosophy can never be isolated, and the surest way to win the heather world…was to se the Christian faith 
upon the firm basis of Platonic philosophy. The natural result was a tirade from the philosophers, because 
he was not philosophic enough and a similar cry of antagonism from the fundamentalists” Cyril C. 
Richardson, "The Condemnation of Origen," Church History 6, no. 1 (1937): 52, accessed August 01, 
2018, doi:10.2307/3160060. 
93 Two particular aspects of Origen’s teachings were singled out as heretical and condemned at the Fifth 
Ecumenical Council of 553 having to do with the preexistence of the human soul and the concept of the 
apokatastasis which holds that at the end of time the absolute power of God necessitates the eternal return 
of all creation to God. Many commentators are not convinced that Origen taught universal salvation as it 
was condemned in the council, for it is none more than him who highlights the importance of human 
agency. To this end, Frederick Norris writes: “(i)n scattered places Origen says quite clearly that he things 
all created intelligence will be restored to God at the end of time. In other places he says, equally clearly, 
that only souls who make the choice for God and practice the virtues God demands will come to rest in 
heaven. Those who do not live for God shall suffer enterally in hell or perhaps be annihilated there.” 
McGuckin, The Westminster Handbook to Origen, 59. 
94 In the article by B. Darrell Jackson entitled “Sources of Origen’s Doctrine of Freedom” he highlights the 
sources of Origen’s formulation of human freedom noting that the transcendental notion of human freedom 
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Origen’s application of personal agency comes at the cost of the necessity of grace is 
“Augustine (who) harshly criticizes what he considers to be Origen’s protology and 
eschatology, i.e. his doctrine of the “beginning” (creation, fall and so on) and the “end”: 
end of the world, the other world and final universal restoration (apokatastasis).”95 
Jerome, while making considerable use of Origen's exegesis of scripture, calls him the 
“father of Pelagianism.”96 This kind of love/hate relationship pervades97 the atmosphere 
surrounding Origen. In fact, the first portion of DeLubac’s work on Origen98 is dedicated 
to the series of anathemas facing this father of the church, most notably the Fifth 
Ecumenical Council in 553. He also offers an extensive analysis of the old quarrels which 
he had with the main thinkers of his time and beyond. I will try to stay out of the quarrels 
here, focusing rather on the great contribution which he makes to our understanding of 
how personal agency works in the Christian context.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
is not necessarily one based on scripture but rather, one rooted in Platonic philosophy: “Origen’s doctrine 
of freedom is more dependent upon philosophical theories than upon Scripture. On the one hand, Scripture 
furnishes data in the form of commandments and promises of divine judgement from which the existence 
of freedom is inferred. It is inferred both as a necessary condition for true obedience and as a sufficient 
explanation of the righteousness of God’s judgment. Scripture also furnishes material for allegory. On the 
other hand, the content of Origen’s doctrine of freedom has a very considerable basis in Platonic and Stoic 
theory. He combines the Platonic transcendental viewpoint with the stoic analysis of the internal structure 
of freedom.” B. Darrell Jackson, "Sources of Origen’s Doctrine of Freedom," Church History 35, no. 01 
(1966): 21, accessed August 01, 2018, doi:10.2307/3162669. 
95 Ilaria Ramelli, “Origen in Augustine: A Paradoxical Reception,” Numen 60 (2013), 283. 
96 Richardson, Condemnation of Origen, 115.  
97 The author offers this well-known metaphor introduced by H.U. von Balthasar, of the work of Origen as 
a “broken flask whose perfume has subcutaneously pervaded nearly all traditions of Christian theology.”  
Anders Christian Jacobsen, Origeniana Undecima: Origen and Origenism in the History of Western 
Thought (Leuven, Belgium: Peeters, 2016), 3 foot note 1. 
98 Cf. Henri De Lubac, History and Spirit: The Understanding of Scripture According to Origen (San 
Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2007). 
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We find in the preface99 of his seminal work De Principiis, Origen includes a 
doctrine of freewill because he understands it to be a tenet of the Christian faith; “one of 
the doctrines set forth by the apostles as essential.”100 He will lay down what he calls the 
teaching of the Church by asserting “the doctrine of the righteous judgment of God, a 
doctrine which, if believed to be true, summons its hearers to live a good life and by 
every means to avoid sin –for it assumes that they acknowledge the deeds worthy of 
praise or of blame lie within (their) own power.”101 In following then, let us look at how 
he exposes this doctrine of the Church. 
The Righteous Judgement of God: A Scriptural Approach 
In beginning his analysis, Origen seeks to assert the freedom of the human person 
by virtue of the righteous judgment of God. “God’s judgement, to be righteous, must be 
exercised on responsible creatures. Responsibility in turn requires freedom.”102 Seeing 
that Origen was first and foremost a scriptural commentator, he was a trailblazer when it 
came to the allegorical method of reading scripture, beyond the literal. In citing scripture, 
he applies many citations to back his claim that free will is a doctrine set forth by the 
apostles. In fact, he so strongly depends on the word of God, that he states there are in the 
“scriptures ten thousand passages which with the utmost clearness prove the existence of 
                                                          
99 Origen, De Principiis, Preface 5: “This also is clearly defined in the teaching of the Church, that every 
rational soul is possessed of free-will and volition; that it has a struggle to maintain with the devil and his 
angels, and opposing influences, because they strive to burden it with sins; but if we live rightly and wisely, 
we should endeavour to shake ourselves free of a burden of that kind.” 
100 Jackson, “Sources of Origen’s Doctrine of Freedom,” 13. 
101 Origen, Paul Koetschau, G. W. Butterworth. Origen on First Principles: Being Koetschau's Text of the 
De Principiis (London, England: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1936), 157. 
102 Jackson, “Sources of Origen’s Doctrine of Freedom,” 13-14. 
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free will.”103 Here, I will take a moment to list the passages which he draws from in De 
Principiis book III, chapter I, in formulating his doctrine of freedom. In pulling from 
these biblical citations, he provides a solid basis for his argument that human freedom is 
fundamental to our experience and in this we find the crux of his Biblical analysis: 
Micah 6:8 “He has shown you, O mortal, what is good. And what does the Lord require 
of you? To act justly and to love mercy and to walk humbly with your God.”  
Deuteronomy 30:19 “This day I call the heavens and the earth as witnesses against you 
that I have set before you life and death, blessings and curses. Now choose life, so that 
you and your children may live.”  
Isaiah 1:19-20 “If you are willing and obedient, you will eat the good things of the land; 
but if you resist and rebel, you will be devoured by the sword.”  
Psalm 81:13-14 “If my people would only listen to me, if Israel would only follow my 
ways, how quickly I would subdue their enemies and turn my hand against their foes!”  
Citing from the New Testament he chooses two passages from the fifth, seventh and 
twenty fifth chapters of St. Matthew (5:39 and 22, 7:24 and 26, and 25:34-35 and 41) 
where Christ highlights the grievances of sin and their resulting judgement.  
Romans 2:4-10 “Or do you show contempt for the riches of his kindness, forbearance and 
patience, not realizing that God’s kindness is intended to lead you to repentance? But 
because of your stubbornness and your unrepentant heart, you are storing up wrath 
against yourself for the day of God’s wrath, when his righteous judgment will be 
revealed. God “will repay each person according to what they have done.” To those who 
by persistence in doing good seek glory, honor and immortality, he will give eternal life. 
But for those who are self-seeking and who reject the truth and follow evil, there will be 
wrath and anger. There will be trouble and distress for every human being who does evil: 
first for the Jew, then for the Gentile; but glory, honor and peace for everyone who does 
good: first for the Jew, then for the Gentile.”  
The above scriptural selections show that the directive of God is for humanity to 
make a conscious choice between the various options which we are faced with. They are 
explicit in asserting the importance of human volition as a divine decree and also are 
helpful for us to see how freedom is operative in divine justice. Origen is seemingly in a 
                                                          
103 Origen, Paul Koetschau, G. W. Butterworth. Origen on First Principles: Being Koetschau's Text of the 
De Principiis (London, England: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1936), 166. 
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constant dialogue with Scripture where he offers biblical assertions explaining that it is 
God who shows man what is good and then it remains up to humanity to choose it. He 
asserts that man has the ability to do good in that he is the creation of the good God and 
as an extension through the righteous judgement of God, each person will be judged in 
accord with the actions they have chosen.  
As an overarching theme in De Principiis, Origen responds not only to the 
Marcionites but also to the Gnostics who say the law of God is missing the component of 
being good and is merely just.104 As we have seen, these systems of belief where static 
dualism is applied, the transcendence of God is maintained by dissociating God from the 
material realm of creation. This type of world view will help to provide an plausible 
explanation as to existence evil in the world, but it also would stand as an obstacle to 
looking at the incarnation. With the rejection of this static dualism, Origen is left with the 
task of offering an explanation for evil in the world in the light of the good and just God 
and in light of human volition.  
Origen also does not shy away from addressing the passages which portray human 
weakness and how evil in the world is utilized to “assert that a wicked being, namely the 
                                                          
104 The idea of a good and just God is repeated several times in De Principiis, namely in book 2.9.5 where 
he names the schools which reject the goodness of God as “Marcion, Valentinus  and Basilides” and where 
in book 3.1.9 he makes a distinction between those who say that God is not good, but only just: “For let 
them observe the conception of a God who is in reality just and good; but if they will not allow this, let it 
be conceded to them for the present that He is just; and let them show how the good and just God, or the 
just God only, appears to be just, in hardening the heart of him who perishes because of his being hardened: 
and how the just God becomes the cause of destruction and disobedience, when men are chastened by Him 
on account of their hardness and disobedience.” Origen, De Principiis, 2.9.5 & 3.1.9. 
29 
 
devil, is the Creator of the world.”105 He looks first and foremost at the passage which has 
and continues to trouble many; the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart referred to in the book of 
Exodus. 
Exodus 4:21 “The Lord said to Moses, “When you return to Egypt, see that you perform 
before Pharaoh all the wonders I have given you the power to do. But I will harden his 
heart so that he will not let the people go.” 
Exodus 7:3 “But I will harden Pharaoh’s heart, and though I multiply my signs and 
wonders in Egypt.” In these passages, Origen notes that Pharaoh appears not to have free 
will. He realizes that this will be asserted as an example that “all others who perish do not 
find cause of their loss in their own free will.”106  
Ezekiel 9: 19-20 “And I will give them singleness of heart and put a new spirit within 
them. I will take away their stony, stubborn heart and give them a tender, responsive 
heart, so they will obey my decrees and regulations. Then they will truly be my people, 
and I will be their God.”  
Mark 4:12 “So that 'they may be ever seeing but never perceiving, and ever hearing but 
never understanding; otherwise they might turn and be forgiven!'”  
Galatians 5:8 “That kind of persuasion does not come from the one who calls you. 
Philippians 2:13 “for it is God who works in you to will and to act in order to fulfill his 
good purpose.” In these passages, the mercy of God is that which is operative and not so 
much human volition but in the divine will.  
Romans 9:18-19 “Therefore God has mercy on whom he wants to have mercy, and he 
hardens whom he wants to harden. One of you will say to me: “Then why does God still 
blame us? For who is able to resist his will?”  
Utilizing these passages Origen responds not only to those who presume that 
actions flow forth from “lost” or “earthly natures” to which they attribute their 
misgivings and which they conceivably can do nothing about,107 but also to those who 
imply that the omniscience necessitates the actions of Pharaoh in that God wanted to use 
                                                          
105 Ibid., 3.1.9. 
106 Weaver, Divine Grace and Human Agency, 167. 
107 “Origen challenges the argument put forth by some groups that claim man cannot act other than by his 
nature. If natures are ruined, there can be neither “the power of willing” nor “the power of movement”; 
“thus, those who apply this logic to Pharaoh imply that God is the author of evil.” Lisa Holliday, "Will 
Satan Be Saved? Reconsidering Origen’s Theory of Volition in Peri Archon," Vigiliae Christianae 63, no. 
1 (2009): 13-14, accessed August 01, 2018, doi:10.1163/157007208x312725. 
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him as a sign.108 To the former idea Origen asks “if this disobedience was implanted in 
him (Pharaoh) by nature, what further need was there for his heart to be hardened by 
God?”109 In this first portion of his response, Origen offers that the hypothesis of a “lost 
nature” should be overthrown. To use the philosophical terms which we have already 
introduced, being fallen is not a substantial quality and is rather an accidental one. “The 
truth is…that it was possible for the men in question to be lost, and the reason why they 
obtain mercy is that they may not be lost, but may come to salvation and possess the 
realms of the holy.”110 
Rather, Origen spends the majority of his time explaining the second objection 
where he sees the allegory in scripture “about Egypt, Tyre, Babylon, Israel, etc. 
references to the heavenly places which are the dwelling places of the soul in the various 
stages of the fall and return.”111 By reading the scriptures in this way, he suggests that the 
disobedience was not arbitrarily added to our nature but rather that humanity would have 
been able to be amazed by the signs and works of God, had it been open to conversion.112 
He posits that the salvation of many is contingent upon this idea of the resistance of many 
                                                          
108 Origen, De Principiis, 3.1.7: “God wanted him still more disobedient for the sake of showing forth 
mighty deeds to the saving of the many, and therefore hardened his heart.” 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Jackson, “Sources of Origen’s Doctrine of Freedom,” 15. 
112 “Origen suggests that men who have fallen so far are on a continuous progress towards wickedness, 
being possessed by the desire for wickedness, which is an inability to learn and use reason. This does not, 
however, preclude hope of a return. Just as powers regressed to a state of wickedness, so too can they 
return to a state of blessedness.” Holliday, "Will Satan Be Saved?,” 16. 
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against the will of God. It is precisely on this point which he concludes “it is on this 
account that his heart is said to be hardened.”113  
By positing the Christian understanding of a good and just God (as opposed to 
one that is simply just), Origen offers in response the words of the letter to the 
Hebrews114 where in one part of the land the rain falls producing bountiful crops as a 
blessing from God and another part of the land produces thorns and thistles that are only 
for the burning. We can summarize that the ground which has the potency to produce 
good things, finds its source in God.115 The fact that the ground also brings forth 
“noxious weeds”116 is not due to such a character in the nature of the soil, but rather in 
the misuse of human freedom; for when humanity neglects to till the soil he “will 
accordingly reap briers and thorns, the most appropriate fruit of their sloth.”117 For him 
the operation of God is one and the same, where on one hand it brings about signs and 
wonders in the life of Moses, and on the other hand it reveals Pharaoh’s hardness of heart 
and the wickedness of his actions. It is pertinent that we distinguish between the grace of 
God revealing the hardness of Pharaoh’s heart and the grace of God which evokes the 
                                                          
113 Ibid.,170. 
114 Hebrews 6:7-8: Land that drinks in the rain often falling on it and that produces a crop useful to those 
for whom it is farmed receives the blessing of God. But land that produces thorns and thistles is worthless 
and is in danger of being cursed. In the end it will be burned. 
115 In Ramelli’s work on “Origen in Augustin: A Paradoxical Reception” she notes that the basis of 
Origen’s notion of the Apokatastasis is the fact that the source of all creation is the good God. Where she 
notes: “for Origen this succession will eventually come to an end at apokatastasis, when the devil also will 
be saved, not as devil, but as a creature of God, and that, after their purification and instruction, all rational 
creatures will be untied in love and will be unable to fall again, because, in Paul’s word, which Origen 
takes up as the basis for his argument, “love never falls out.” Ramelli, “Origen in Augustin: A Paradoxical 
Reception,” 289.  
116 Origen, De Principiis, 3.1.10. 
117 Ibid. 
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hardness of Pharaoh’s heart.118 Utilizing the same passage, Origen makes another 
important point; the wrath of God was not immediate against Pharaoh offering him an 
ample amount of time for his repentance.  
 According to Origen, the foreknowledge of God does not stand as an obstacle to 
God’s goodness, in that his foreknowledge does not compel one to do bad, rather it urges 
man towards to the good: “nor does the knowledge of God compel us to do so unless we 
ourselves contribute something towards the good result.”119 In the commentary of De 
Principiis, the editor suggests that Origen’s solution to these difficult passages “lies in the 
thought that God, like a good physician, works for the salvation of all, though sometimes 
by painful remedies.”120 His application of the divine will of the good and just God, will 
also address the idea of stoic necessity and also determinism which comes about from a 
wrong understanding of divine omniscience and divine providence.  
In the Philokalia of Origen he notes that there are people of the faith who “are 
distracted at the thought that human affairs may be governed by necessity, and cannot 
possibly be otherwise than is ruled by the stars.”121 This is problematic to Origen not only 
                                                          
118 “Faustus differed from Origen in that for Faustus the divine action was understood not simply to have 
revealed but also to have evoked the hardening or the softening of the heart. In other words, Faustus spoke 
of a more direct interaction between the divine agent and the human agent than had Origen.” Weaver, 
Divine Grace and Human Agency, 170. 
119 Ibid., 46. 
120 Origen, Paul Koetschau, G. W. Butterworth. Origen on First Principles: Being Koetschau's Text of the 
De Principiis (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1936), 176 foot note 2. 
121 Origen, Basil, and Gregory. The Philokalia of Origen: A Compilation of Selected Passages from 
Origen's Works Made by St. Gregory of Nazianzus and St. Basil of Caesarea (Edinburgh, Scotland: T. & T. 
Clark, 1911): 23.1, accessed August 01, 2018, 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=h8h&bquery=(HJ+5XBO)&type=1&site=ehost-
live. 
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because this brings about the “complete destruction of Free Will”122 but furthermore, 
because it turns God into an unjust judge who places blame or praise upon people who 
did not choose to do the good or bad they have done. If the human person is 
fundamentally not free, “the distinction between acceptable conduct and conduct 
deserving of blame is lost.”123 As an extension to that idea, Origen continues to explain 
that the two ideas of blessedness or punishment are undermined by such a cosmology 
where freedom is not operative.  
While his presentation of human freedom seems limitless, due to his 
understanding of nature (something that will cause his condemnation in later years) what 
we wish to assert is Origen’s understanding that in order for God to be just and good, 
human freedom must be operative. In the end, Origen does not present a God who is a 
tyrant, but a ruler and divine physician. “He does not coerce but encourages and he 
wishes that those under him yield themselves willingly to his direction so that the good of 
someone may not be by compulsion, but according to his own choice.”124 For Origen that 
God is both good and just is not simply a matter of responding to the heresies of his time, 
it is necessary for the presupposition of salvation and the divine decree that God desires 
the salvation of all people. 
                                                          
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Cf. John Clark Smith, The Ancient Wisdom of Origen (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 
1992), 47. There is a similar idea presented in Origen’s Oratio 29.15 where “God does not wish that the 
good should come to someone by necessity but willingly.” Origen, Oratio, 29.15.  
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The Internal Structure of Freedom: A Philosophical Approach 
Yet Origen’s understanding of human freedom is not solely extrapolated from 
scriptural sources, for as we noted in the beginning of this section, he was also a man of 
philosophy. When dealing with the idea of salvation, Origen’s authorship points us not 
exclusively to our first point on the goodness of God, but moreover, on the ability of 
humanity to cooperate with the divine will to attain salvation though a synergy of 
wills.125 When speaking on human agency, he distinguishes humanity from lower beings 
by putting them in a separate category; those which have “the causes of their movements 
from within themselves, while others receive them from without.”126 In making this the 
first division of the internal structure of freedom, Origen, follows the Platonic analysis of 
soul in terms of motion.127 Beyond that, he explains that rational animals have the faculty 
of reason, by which they can judge and discern between the natural movement: 
disapproving of and rejecting some, approving of and accepting others.128 This is 
described as a “faculty of distinguishing between good and evil, and when man has done 
this he possesses also the power of choosing that which he has approved of, he is rightly 
deemed worthy of praised when he chooses what is good, and of blame when he follows 
what is base and evil.”129  
                                                          
125 “the human will alone is not sufficient to obtain salvation.” Origen, De Principiis, 3.1.18. 
126 Origen, Paul Koetschau, G. W. Butterworth. Origen on First Principles: Being Koetschau's Text of the 
De Principiis (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1936), 157-158. 
127 Cf. Jackson, “Sources of Origen’s Doctrine of Freedom,”17. 
128 Cf. Origen, De Principiis, 3.1.1. 
129 Origen, Paul Koetschau, G. W. Butterworth. Origen on First Principles: Being Koetschau's Text of the 
De Principiis (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1936), 160. 
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He also makes the point that there are certain things which we encounter that are 
not subject to human action but rather those which illicit reason, calling them motions 
from without.130 “Origen may have learned the Stoic scheme (of the class of things 
moved) from Clement, in (his) Stromata”.131 Here there is a whole genealogy of 
philosophical appropriation where he notes that it remains within our own ability as to 
how one encounters and receives these motions through the use of “the faculty of 
reason”.132 He clarifies that those who claim movements from without are impossible to 
resist, causing us to do certain things, is simple cop out, “invented for the sole purpose of 
denying the freedom of the will.”133  
Yet Origen’s most complete philosophical treatment on human agency is found in 
Contra Celsus, namely in book III where he responds to Celsus’ claim that a person is 
unable to repent due to the habit of sinning and due to a fallen nature. Celsus says "it is 
manifest to everyone that no one by chastisement, much less by merciful treatment, could 
effect a complete change in those who are sinners both by nature and custom, for to 
change nature is an exceedingly difficult thing. But they who are without sin are partaken 
of a better life."134 Celsus is without a doubt is influenced by the stoic notions which we 
mentioned previously, namely here the pressures of fate and the lack of choice. 
                                                          
130 Origen, De Principiis, 3.1.2. 
131 Jackson, “Sources of Origen’s Doctrine of Freedom,” 20. 
132 Origen, De Principiis, 3.1.3. 
133 Origen, Paul Koetschau, G. W. Butterworth. Origen on First Principles: Being Koetschau's Text of the 
De Principiis (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1936),162. 
134 Origen, Contra Celsum, 3.65. 
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Origen refutes the claim of Celsus stating that he “committed a great error, in 
refusing to those who are sinners by nature, and also by habit, the possibility of a 
complete transformation”135 by showing how it is that an entire transformation was 
possible in the lives of figures in salvation history but also figures from the philosophical 
world such as Hercules, Ulysses, Socrates and Musonius.136 Origen not only takes issue 
with Celsus’ claim because of the ability of humanity to repent, but he also takes issue 
with the idea that such a fatalistic state is one which is given by nature. For him, the 
recovery of virtue is not only a possible thing for humanity; moreover it is possible 
through the power of reason because sin is against reason, an idea he derives from 
Gnosticism.137 Even more so, Origen proclaims, for those who are followers of Jesus, 
given the word of God and “accredited by the Spirit.”138 In the realm of faith he professes 
that “the word of God through their (own) instrumentality, transformed numbers of 
persons who had been sinners both by nature and habit, whom no one could have 
reformed by punishment, but who were changed by the word, which moulded and 
transformed them according to its pleasure.”139 While maintaining the efficacy of the 
word of God is operative in the life of the disciple, each through their own 
instrumentality, he concedes to Celsus that such an endeavor of changing "a nature 
entirely is exceedingly difficult."140 Here, we must remember that Christian theology did 
not really elaborate a notion of ‘nature’ until the Christological disputes forced such a 
                                                          
135 Ibid. 
136 Cf. Ibid., 3.66. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid., 3.67. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid., 3.69. 
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development. However, he argues that in every rational soul, which the Author of all 
things has made good, out of His own goodness, may have become “wicked through 
education, and perverse example, and surrounding influences, so that wickedness has 
been naturalized in some individuals.”141 When the word of God working in conjunction 
with human agency, it is possible for a person to change his/her own nature “if a man 
only believe that he must entrust himself to the God of all things, and do everything with 
a view to please Him.”142 He continues that for God, it cannot be that "both good and bad 
are in the same honor, Or that the idle man and he who labored much Perish alike."143 
Paradoxically, this is actually not very different from what St. Jerome would say in 
attacking apokatastasis.144 
The cause of such repentance and conversion must lie in a person’s own will, 
where deliberate choices and actions “avail much towards the accomplishment of things 
which appear to be very difficult, and...almost impossible.”145 He will conclude by saying 
that when one holds such views about the inability of the human person to repent, it does 
not reflect upon the nature of God, but rather on the nature of the person, whom God has 
formed with powers for the attainment of things of such difficulty.  
                                                          
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid. Emphasis Added. 
143 Ibid. 
144 “Jerome denounces "the restitution of all things" because the concept implies that "it will be the same 
for Gabriel as for the devil, for Paul as for Caiaphas, for virgins as for whores".” Elizabeth A. Clark, “The 
Place of Jerome's Commentary on Ephesians in the Origenist Controversy” Vigiliae Christianae  41, no. 2 
(1987): 155. 
145 Origen, Contra Celsum, 3.69. 
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He will further address human agency in the same chapter by again quoting 
Celsus, saying "they who are without sin are partakers of a better life."146 For Origen, it is 
not clear whether Celsus means those who are without sin from the beginning of their 
lives (i.e. as a product of nature), or those who have become so by transformation. The 
former theory is a sort of application of the gnostic idea of the natures all over again, 
predestining some for a life of sanctity and others for a life of sin. Origen will reject the 
first premise on account that there is no human cooperation.147 If, on the other hand, he is 
referring to those who are blessed after a transformation and repentance through 
submission to the saving word God, then we can consider the role of personal agency as 
being operative in that person’s ability to become free from sin.148 
For Origen the word of God, is operative in the lives of those who believe and is 
continually passing from one generation to the next permeating the souls of those who 
seek its contents. While the word is operative and can make from a person what he calls 
“a friend of God and the prophets,”149 it remains by virtue of what he calls “the doctrine 
of Christianity,”150 not operative in the lives of those who are “unwilling, but those who 
have chosen the better life, and that which is pleasing to God.”151 The divine will is 
operative in the lives of those who seek it, but it does not happen through a passive 
process, instead rather, through co-operation. Continuing on this, he notes that Celsus 
objects to this kind of cooperation with divine grace, maintaining instead that what is 
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147 “there cannot possibly be any.” Ibid. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid., 4.3. 
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151 Ibid. 
39 
 
operative is not cooperation with the divine grace, but that it is divine power itself though 
which God makes humanity better. To this he will ask: “where, then, is our free will? 
And what credit is there in assenting to the truth? Or how is the rejection of what is false 
praiseworthy?”152 By posing these questions he juxtaposes the rationality of cooperation 
with that of passive operation. He will also assert that it would have been easy for God to 
“to create men who needed no improvement, but who were of themselves virtuous and 
perfect, evil being altogether non-existent.”153 He will conclude with the brilliant axiom 
which helps us to look into the nature of human cooperation: “if you take away the 
spontaneity of virtue, you destroy its essence.”154 
In summation, Origen’s doctrine of human freedom goes to accomplish two very 
important tasks: on the one hand, it upholds what scripture teaches on the necessity of 
human freedom “inferred both as a necessary condition for true obedience and as a 
sufficient explanation of the righteousness of God’s judgment,”155 while providing 
necessary explanation and context to the difficult passages, which seemingly make the 
person passive in front of the divine will and omniscience. On the other hand, Origen 
presents a philosophical argument based on the causes of movement in the person 
combining “the Platonic transcendental viewpoint with the Stoic analysis of the internal 
structure of freedom”156 to counter the claims made by Celsus and others who assert the 
impossibility of repentance and conversion. The hallmark of Origen’s downfall in 
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doctrine of Apokatastasis, was nothing more than such a double assertion of scripture and 
philosophy; for the doctrine “stemmed from Origen’s criticism of Gnostic determinism 
against the backdrop of the theodicy problem (presented in scripture).”157  
St. Thomas Aquinas 
The monk John Cassian builds on the spiritual tradition of Origen.158 We find that 
in one of his great works, the Collationes, John asserts that “God works all things in us 
and yet everything can be ascribed to free will.”159 In this assertion, he aims to maintain 
two seemingly contradictory assertions: the first having to do with the necessity of grace 
which is so operative in Christianity and the second having to do with the responsibility 
of personal actions in the struggle towards perfection. In this double assertion, both 
human integrity and necessity of divine assistance are necessary for all to be saved, again 
the notion of cooperation.  
Cassian seems to be the perfect segue into our look at Aquinas and his 
understanding of freedom operative through secondary causality. To begin this 
undertaking, it is necessary to outline the meaning of free will utilizing classical 
                                                          
157 Ramelli, “Origen in Augustine: A Paradoxical Reception,” 287. 
158 In order to provide an introit into the work of Aquinas, we speak about the work of the monk John 
Cassian who offers an axiom close to Aquinas’ idea of primary and secondary causality. The link between 
Origen and Cassian is seen in the following citation: “(a)ppropriate to Cassian’s own interest, his 
connection with Origen came through Evagrius Ponticus, the leader of a monastic community in Nitria.” 
Weaver, Divine Grace and Human Agency, 82. 
159 John Cassian, “The Conferences of John Cassian” (Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Classics Ethereal 
Library, 2003), chapter 8, accessed August 01, 2018, http://www.ccel.org/ccel/cassian/conferences.html. 
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(scholastic) philosophical anthropology to which Aquinas is a major contributor.160  In 
this endeavor what Aquinas “set out to prove was the compatibility of Aristotelian 
materialism with Christian idealist dogma and to construct a unified view of nature, 
mankind, and God.”161 
According to this tradition, every act of knowing, whether through the senses or 
in the intellect, is chronologically prior to a produced response. This response, which is 
called an appetite, and its existence can be discovered either by introspection (having to 
do with the inclinations we have because of our knowledge) or through the external 
experiential “sensible” world. Appetites have a tendency towards something or away 
from it depending on the value of the good sensed.162 
In that form flows from being, each substantial form of an object is the source of 
its natural inclinations. This idea is expressed by Aquinas in part one of the Summa where 
he says an “inclination follows every form: for example, fire, by its form, is inclined to 
rise, and to generate its like.”163 These inclinations, which arise from the form of objects 
are called natural appetites. Natural appetites are generally not subject to change and are 
largely predictable, since they flow simply from form. There is, however, another class of 
appetites which are distinct from natural appetites and which do change: elicited appetites 
or appetites of the soul. There are two types of appetites of the soul: intellectual appetites, 
                                                          
160 I will use Michael J. Dodds, Philosophical Anthropology (Oakland, CA: Western Dominican Province, 
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freedom of will. 
161 Stent, “Paradoxes of Free Will,” 72. 
162 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q.80, a.1. 
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which is otherwise known as the “will” and the sense appetites, which is known as 
“passions”. Aquinas considers the appetites which stem in the intellect as superior to 
those which stem in the sensory or “animal” domains for we choose them not passively 
but by an act of intellect.164 
The power of the will is distinct from the power of the intellect in that their 
objects are different. “Truth is the object of the intellect and the good is the object of the 
will”165 yet for the most part the agency of the will and intellect interact; something 
which is deemed as true is also good. The distinction then between the will and intellect 
is in the way that each is related to their specific object. Aquinas points out that while 
“knowledge comes about insofar as the object known is within the knower… the will 
goes out to what is outside it.”166 The will is said to be moved then not by universal or 
general reasons, but by a particular or practical reason. 
Yet acts of the will do not necessarily end in a movement but rather in an 
intention to move. Commanded acts will necessarily move something, yet elicited acts 
are those which have decided to move but have not yet done any moving.167 This then 
brings us to the core idea of the freedom of the will. “Aquinas argues that humans must 
have free will since ‘otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards 
and punishments would be in vain.’”168 
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For him, freedom is something we can contemplate introspectively, we realize 
that when we have more than one option, we can choose one over another. Part of our 
experience is that when we choose well, the resulting outcome of our choice brings us 
some attainment of the good, we have received a reward or recompense for that act of the 
will or choice. But this experience of being able to be rewarded or inversely punished, 
means that I am in control over my own actions and that I have made a decision between 
at least two options. Without the ability to control my own actions, I cannot say that I am 
free for I would be acting out of “chance or by necessity. Since we find purpose in our 
actions, it does not seem we act by chance.”169 Considering necessity, Aquinas describes 
three types of necessity: natural and absolute necessity, necessity of end or utility and 
necessity of coercion. According to Aquinas, necessity of end does not remove the ability 
for an act of the will for an end can be reached in many ways. “Where there are several 
proximate ends, or several means to the last end, there can be freedom of choice.”170 In 
the end, we must understand freedom of will not as an act of autonomy, but rather an 
ability to obtain what we most deeply understand as good. In order for us to connect our 
starting point and end point conscious freedom which include acts of the will lead us to 
the good which we desire to do. 
Aquinas also does the hard work of explaining how to ascribe something 
completely to God and also to the will of the human actor, through secondary 
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causality.171 When considering divine causality, Aquinas considers the Aristotelian 
modes of creaturely causality which we have already discussed at length: necessary, 
contingent, free and chance. “If Aquinas were asked to which of these categories divine 
action belongs, he would answer, “None of the above.” God’s causality transcends all 
these categories of creaturely action, just as God’s being transcends the whole order of 
creaturely existence.”172 
The work of Etienne Gilson helps us to understand the dynamic of secondary 
causality more clearly: “God does whatever creatures do; and yet creatures themselves do 
whatever they do. It is a question of understating how one and the same effect can 
proceed simultaneously from two different causes: God and the natural agent which 
produces it. At first sight this seems incomprehensible.”173 The beautiful thing about this 
system is that even though God does whatever creatures do, he seemingly does not do it 
until creatures themselves decide to do it and so if “we affirm divine transcendence, we 
                                                          
171 Aquinas upheld that human free will not only exists but also is compatible with God's foreknowledge of 
our actions. In Summa Theologiae I, q22.3 he states “that the dignity of causality is imparted even to 
creatures” this causality is to be seen at a different level (transcendentally) than the causality imparted to 
creatures. This notion is made clear in Summa Theologiae I, q.105.5 where he states: “God work in every 
worker, according to these three things. First as an end. For since every operation is for the sake of some 
good, real or apparent; and nothing is good either really or apparently, except in as far as it participates in a 
likeness to the Supreme Good, which is God; it follows that God Himself is the cause of every operation as 
its end. Again it is to be observed that where there are several agents in order, the second always acts in 
virtue of the first; for the first agent moves the second to act. And thus all agents act in virtue of God 
Himself: and therefore He is the cause of action in every agent.” In this way the idea of secondary causality 
helps us to understand that the divine cause is not on the same level as the human cause, or else God would 
not have imparted causality to creatures. 
172 Dodds, Unlocking Divine Action, 206. 
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can see that secondary causality neither diminishes the power of God nor distorts that of 
creatures.”174  
In the words of Aquinas himself: 
God wills whatever is required for a thing that he wills…But it befits certain things 
according to the mode of their nature, that they be contingent and not necessary. 
Therefore, God wills that somethings be contingent. Now the efficacy of the divine will 
requires not only that something be that God wills to be, but also that it be as he wills it to 
be. For, among, natural agents as well, when the acting power is strong it assimilates its 
effect into itself not only as to species but also as to the accidents, which are certain 
modes of that thing. Therefore, the efficacy of the divine will does not remove 
contingency.175 
Aquinas’ view on free will and his efforts to bring understanding to creaturely causality 
in a world where God acts will be fundamental to our later understanding of ethical 
theory. To see how this understanding developed we will look at the work of another 
great Dominican of our contemporary period, Servais-Théodore Pinckaers in his Sources 
of Christian Ethics. In that Aquinas’ moral theory is based on both the human function of 
cognition and the natural inclinations of appetitive powers, it is precisely in the exercise 
of free will that “St. Thomas perceives the true image of God within us, for it is in our 
mastery over our actions that we show forth his image”.176 Pinckaers characterizes the 
freedom presented in the moral theory developed from this patristic and scholastic 
tradition as a “freedom for excellence”177 as opposed to the later tradition developed in 
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the modern era by William of Ockham which he calls a “freedom of indifference”.178 
While in the system of ‘freedom for excellence’ the human person seen to be naturally 
drawn to truth, goodness and happiness as an end and in that freedom is a faculty which 
proceeds from “reason and will, which unite to make the act of choice. This act of choice 
is thus formed by practical judgments and willing.”179 On the other hand in systems of 
ethical theory which maintain a ‘freedom of indifference’ free will precedes “reason and 
will in such a way as to move them to their acts. “For I can freely choose,” (Ockham) 
said “to know or not to know, to will or not to will.” For him, free will was the prime 
faculty, anterior to intelligence and will as well as to their acts.”180 By making free will 
anterior to intelligence and will the focus of freedom became centered not so much on the 
end result, “an attraction towards the good exercised in love and desire”181 rather on the 
choice of the act; “freedom lay entirely in the power of the will to choose between 
contraries, and this power resided in the will alone.”182  
 Pinckaers explains that the seeming subtlety of the locus of freedom has important 
repercussions, many of which are seen in our contemporary misunderstanding of what 
freedom is and even what we would consider as the denial of human freedom. First, he 
explains that our modern understanding of will is one repercussion where the will is seen 
as “a conscious pressure of self upon self”183 which “no longer (is) characterized by love 
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but by the relationship of command and obedience.”184 In this a person seeks to choose 
freely rather than to choose what is good for them. As a result, the breach between 
freedom and the natural inclinations has caused us at times to reject our own happiness in 
order to fulfill our desire for freedom.  
Moreover, Pinckaers explains that for Aquinas the natural inclinations which 
humans exhibit are an expression of the divine respect for the natural order of the world. 
This is expressed in the term “sequi naturam, or conformity with nature”185 which 
coupled along with “the primal longing for happiness”186 is the basis for how human 
actions were linked together to form “an organic, permanent, whole, where the present 
flowed from the past and opened into the future.”187 The entire view of time, 
accomplishment, cooperation and the ability to do good in the eyes of God which we 
have discussed at length previously. This had its root not solely in the knowledge of 
divine ordinances but were moreover a natural procession of inclinations in the human 
person. This organic unity between human actions and the natural order of the created 
world had also been disrupted by the reordering found in a ‘freedom of indifference’ a 
“fully deliberate result of placing humanity in a central position…impregnated with a 
secret passion for self-affirmation, deeper than any of its manifestations and 
expressions.”188  
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In this light, we can see that when one does not understand freedom and will in 
their appropriate and natural contexts the results are tragic. Pinckaers helps us to realize 
that the ‘freedom of indifference’ brought about “a breaking away from natural 
inclinations and sensibility, habitus and virtues, finality, continuity and loyalty. All these 
ruptures meet in the final break between free will and reason.”189 With Aquinas’ 
understanding moreover, freedom and will remain united to form free choice. In a 
‘freedom for excellence,’ the ability to live a life which is fulfilling remains within reach 
and the internal struggles between nature and will are overcome. In the concept of sequi 
naturam, maintained by this tradition, nature “does not restrain human freedom; it is 
essentially liberating. It produces a spontaneity in the spiritual order that is very different, 
in its relationship to freedom, from the spontaneity of the senses”.190 Likewise, freedom 
is not limited by the will, rather through its healthy application the human person 
develops into the image of God. The external world does not pose a threat; instead it 
remains the locus for “fruitful exchange”191 of humanity in virtue and charity. 
Chapter 3: The Islamic Understanding of Free Will 
Moving from the Christian conception of freedom of will to the Islamic concept, 
one must realize that there is quite a bit of similarity in background; they both emerged in 
the same geographical location, with the same fatalistic roots received from Gnostic and 
Stoic ideas presented earlier. More importantly though seeing that both Islam and 
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Christianity like Judaism professed a monotheistic faith, the ideas of divine omnipotence 
and omniscience were once again necessarily operative. Much like Judaism and 
Christianity, the fact that there was a definitive and united revelatory text did not result in 
a unified understanding concerning human freedom. Unlike Judaism and Christianity, the 
revealed text of Islam presents not only an idea of human destiny but also a term for it 
(qadar) which is found in the Quran.  
How that term is explained and understood in light of the divine attributes will 
bring about a multiplicity of interpretations and meanings and for us to imply that all 
Muslims ascribe to fatalism would be a fallacy. Montgomery Watt in his book Islamic 
Philosophy and Theology offers that the notion of fatalism lies not so much on the 
concept of qadar but rather in the pre-Islamic conception of time; where “time is 
conceived as an impersonal force identified with ‘fate’ or ‘destiny’.”192 This notion of 
time is critical to how one views the causality of God within the world. As noted briefly 
in in the introduction and also in the chapter 1, if one holds to a view of God in time, then 
it is difficult for us to overcome fatalism in systems of belief. As regards the problem of 
freedom of the will, two mutually opposed schools – Mutalzilites and Asharites – came 
into existence, one upholding complete freedom of will and the other one asserting 
radical pre-determinism.  
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The Question of Qadar in Islam  
The sixth article of belief in Islam is the ascent to fate, called qadar. As we 
explained briefly in the introduction, the word expresses the power of God which is 
operative in the created world. The classical Sunni understanding the concept of destiny 
in Islam, stands on four pillars: the first is the knowledge of God, the second, is that all 
things are written in a preserved tablet, third, that only the will of God is operative and 
fourth, creation can will only secondarily to the will of God.193  
Foreknowledge is to believe that God knows all things: general and specific, at all 
times and places, both in hypothesis and in fact. With God are the keys to the unseen, for 
he knows all that is in land and sea, there is not a leaf that falls without him knowing 
about it, there is not a seed in the dark recesses of earth which is not known to him. There 
is nothing dry, nothing wet that is not written in a book194 and already predestined. In 
another passage, God knows all that is before humanity and all that is hidden from their 
view.195 In this way, the knowledge of God is on a different level than the knowledge 
given to creation, for it is never the fact that God does not know and then comes into 
                                                          
193 Herein the doctrine of qadar in Sunni Islam is being paraphrased from the article by Shaykh Faraz 
Rabbani, "Moral Responsibility and Divine Will," Sunni Path, accessed August 01, 2018, 
http://qa.sunnipath.com/issue_view.asp?HD 1&ID=131&CATE=24. 
194 This is a paraphrase from Quran 6: 59: God “knows whatever there is in the land and in the sea; not a 
leaf falls, but He knows it. There is not a grain in the darkness of the earth, nor anything fresh or dry, but is 
written in a Clear Record.” In the commentary by Yusuf Ali he helps us to understand that qadar can only 
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knowing. Nor is God’s knowledge followed by forgetfulness. In this manner, Islam holds 
that God knows in a manner different than us, in that all things are written in a book and 
all things in that book are known to God. Yet, they posit not just one book (The 
Preserved Tablet) but four.  
a. The Preserved Tablet: According to the majority of Islamic religious 
scholarship, before the creation of the universe, God created a Preserved 
Tablet or Record containing everything that has happened or will happen 
during the course of the existence of all creation. The tablet was said to 
have been written some 50,000 years before God created heaven and the 
earth.196 
b. Lifetime records: At the moment that a fetus gets though the first stages of 
development in the womb, God determines all things that are written down 
in the book of life. An angel is sent to blow the soul into the fetus and the 
newly formed human is given four commands: his livelihood, his death, 
his deeds, his fortune and misfortune.197 
c. The annual record: On the night of qadr,198 God sends forth his decree on 
everything that will happen in a given year. The decree is written in the 
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annual record. On that night when God sends down his decree for the year, 
every wise matter is decided by God and begun to be made known to man. 
On this night, Muslims are called to keep vigil, praying that good things 
would come to them in the new year. 
d. The daily record: Each day has a daily record by which the day progresses. 
In this, things come to pass in day the affairs which God has destined. 
Some will be given life, some will have their lives taken away.199 
The literature in the Quran which introduced and upheld the conception of qadar 
as a dogma of the faith are the following: 
Surah 57:14 “They will cry out to them: Were we not with you? They shall say: Yes! but 
you caused yourselves to fall into temptation, and you waited and doubted, and vain 
desires deceived you till the threatened punishment of Allah came, while the archdeceiver 
deceived you about Allah.”  
Surah 8:23 “And if Allah had known any good in them He would have made them hear, 
and if He makes them hear they would turn back while they withdraw.”  
Surah 11:119 “Nor would thy Lord be the One to destroy communities for a single 
wrong-doing, if its members were likely to mend. If thy Lord had so willed, He could 
have made mankind one people: but they will not cease to dispute. Except those on whom 
thy Lord hath bestowed His Mercy: and for this did He create them: and the Word of thy 
Lord shall be fulfilled: "I will fill Hell with jinns and men all together.””  
Surah 57:22 “No calamity befalls on the earth or in yourselves but is inscribed in the 
Prescribed Tablet, before We bring it into existence. Verily, that is easy for Allah.”  
In these scriptural texts, the following points must be highlighted. First, the idea 
of Divine Omniscience requires that God has knowledge of human actions. The idea that 
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USC, "The Qur'an," Center for Muslim-Jewish Engagement, 097.001-004, accessed August 01, 2018, 
http://cmje.usc.edu/religious-texts/quran/. 
199 Paraphrased from Quran 5:32.  
53 
 
these actions are brought about by what is written is a rejected precept, for though God 
knows the actions of man before they are to take place, the actions of humanity are 
subject to punishment or reward according to their nature. To this end, certain acts can 
affect destiny for in one of the hadeeth, it is attributed to Muhammad that “a person may 
be deprived of provision because of sins that he commits, and the decree is not warded 
off by anything but prayer, and nothing increases one’s lifespan except righteousness.”200 
It is interesting to look at the following hadith from Sahih Muslim which speaks of how 
the prophet of Islam understood the concept of qadar as not being cause for passivity in 
the life of the Muslim:  
Ali narrated that one day the Messenger of Allah was sitting with a wooden 
stick in his hand with which he was scratching the ground. He raised his head 
and said, “There is none of you, but has his place assigned either in the Fire or 
in Paradise.” They (the Companions) inquired, “O Allah’s Messenger! Why 
should we carry on doing good deeds, shall we depend (upon Qadar) and give 
up work?” Muhammad said: “No, carry on doing good deeds, for everyone 
will find it easy (to do) such deeds that will lead him towards that for which 
he has been created.” Then he recited the verse: “As for him who gives (in 
charity) and keeps his duty to Allah and fears Him, and believes in al-Husna, 
We will make smooth for him the path of Ease (goodness) (Surah 92:5-7).201 
While everything on the preserved tablet is determined, but the things which take 
place on the lower books may be changed. These changes would be reflected in the 
preserved tablet, but already determined there. Through prayer and righteous actions, a 
person can cooperate in some way, seeing that the things handed down are still 
changeable so long as they have not been written in the lower books. Inherently some 
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philosophers see a problem with this view.202 The problem lies in the fact that if the four 
books are connected, and the first is determined, then following reason, the things written 
in the lower books will reflect only that which is determined. There is no room for 
change in this system, but as Alfred Guillaume notes: “Prophets are not theologians!”203 
In understanding qadar we have to speak about the will. The will of God holds in 
it the belief that everything came into existence, from non-existence, through the will of 
God. Human actions are not withheld from those things which come into existence. God 
does whatever He wills and God decided that we should have a will, so our will is a 
product to His will and is secondary it. In that God's will takes precedence in all things. 
God’s will is tied to justice, so His will, will not wrong anyone. Everything that is willed 
for you is tied to divine wisdom. In Islam, both paradise and hellfire are tied to the 
necessity of human agency. The presence of human will mean God does not punish 
someone for something that wasn’t in his hands, nor are you are rewarding him for what 
he did not have the will do. This view will be held by a school of thought which 
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maintained the principle of human agency by explaining “moral and ethical truth (in a 
unique manner) in the whole course of Muslim theology.”204  
Multazilites 
Between the time of the redaction of the Quran (30 Hijri or 650 AD) and the 
publication of the first authoritative collection of traditions (245 Hijri or 859 AD) we find 
the emergence of the work and school founded by Wasil bin Ata,205 a pupil of the mosque 
at Basra and the founder of the Mutalzalite view, literally meaning “those set apart”.206 
The Mutazilites held that “all men of sound mind know in an immediate and irreducible 
intuition that certain acts…are morally obligatory”.207  These human actions hold with 
them an ethical value “what is good or best, or right or wrong, to do in any situation.”208 
In regards to human knowledge, the Mutalzilites viewed ethical culpability as being 
limited due to our “incomplete knowledge of present circumstances and of future 
contingents… (while in juxtaposition) God’s knowledge of the circumstances and of the 
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consequences of His acts (and of ours) is eternal and exhaustive.”209 Yet the knowledge 
of God is not one which obtrusive for “neither God’s acts nor our voluntary acts are 
causally predetermined.”210 
Much like Origen, the Mutazilites spoke of the importance of moral actions and 
the resulting blame or praise211 while also asserting the justice of God. “God’s justice 
obliges him to act in accordance with the moral law. For instance, he is thus bound to 
stand by his promise to reward the righteous with paradise and his threat to punish the 
wicked with hellfire.”212 Moreover, not only will God “reward good and punish evil, as 
the Qur’an everywhere attests, but the divine perfection makes it impossible that God 
“perform, whether directly or indirectly…, any act which is not ethically good.””213 Also 
like Origen, it seems that they adopted an allegorical reading of the Quran, applying it to 
the numerical unity of the God (Divine Oneness) and also to the various 
anthromorphisms which appear in the Quran regarding God.214 
As a result of this view, the “human individual has an ability to act which is a 
capacity of performance that is sufficient for the performance of an act but not sufficient 
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for the creating or initiating absolutely.”215 In this a person can be seen as being 
responsible for their own actions and ascribing blame or reward for such actions would 
be fitting with “the basic conception of God as just and impartial”.216 In upholding divine 
justice, this school finds scriptural support for human freedom from two main verses of 
the Quran, namely “(w)hoever acts virtuously does so for himself”217 and “(n)othing 
belongs to man save what he strives for”.218  
Beyond divine justice and the moral reading of the scriptures, the Mutazilites also 
focus on the importance of reason. This is based on the precept that “(r)evelation only 
confirms what reason dictates.”219 With this precept the Mutazilite school will reject 
notions which make the actions of God seem irrational. This idea is expressed by the  
Caliph Umar who was asked by a man caught in the imprudence of drinking alcohol, why 
he was being punished if it was God's will for him to be caught. In this hadith, the man is 
asserting his lack of will. Umar responds emphatically: “and it is God's will that I punish 
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you for your imprudence”.220 In this method of responding to the man who attempts to 
blame qadar for the negative things that he has done, the notion of rationality is 
undermined. For the man who seeks to blame God for his transgression would never to 
ascribe the good things he has done to destiny, rather he would attribute them more 
proximately to his own agency, and so it would remain irrational for him to ascribe his 
transgressions to God. Yet, the rational claims which the Mutalizites would make on 
human causality would be countered by a later school known as the Asharites. 
Asharaites 
The Asharite school, founded by an Iraqi Arab theologian al-Ashari of the 9th 
Century offered that “God preordains everything that happens on earth, including what 
man wills and does, and what befalls man, good or bad.”221 Al-Ashari was a student of 
the Hanbalite tradition; one of the four main schools of interpretation in Islam which 
asserts that the contents of the Quran are “the uncreated speech of God…(and) that the 
descriptions to the found in the Quran, even the anthromorphic ones, were to be taken at 
face value…without questioning its true meaning.”222 A return to the literal interpretation 
of scripture would become emblematic to this school of thought, as would the application 
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of the divine attributes of God as “real entities subsisting independently of God. (This 
school) claimed that God is powerful by virtue of a power residing in him and wise by 
virtue of wisdom residing in him.”223 In that, the divine attributes are seen as being 
eternal and as a result, should be asserted as efficacious in the world, not simply as 
descriptive of God.224 
Human actions, as a result, are grounded simply in the dictates of God and can 
find no causality at the level of the person. “The ethical valuations of actions are 
grounded neither in the acts themselves nor in their properties; they are grounded simply 
in what God says.”225 The concepts of good actions or bad actions are not grounded in the 
moral value of the action itself, but rather must be seen in view of what God has 
dictated.226 By asserting the last and fourth pillar in qadar as creation. This school of 
thought asserted that God who is the creator of all things, creates all things by decree, 
from celestial things to people. People’s actions are not withheld from the list of created 
things. As we have seen above, God also decrees whether an action is good or bad in 
order for there to be objectivity in the actions of humans.227  
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In regard to human freedom, the Asharites “assert a theory of acquisition which 
implies that although God has pre-destined human actions, yet man has been given some 
power of actualizing those actions.”228 In acquisition “God not only creates and 
determines the human act but is also the act’s sole Agent. If humans may be said to act, it 
is only in a metaphorical sense. There is no difference between human acts and the 
movements of inanimate bodies or between voluntary and involuntary acts. God creates 
all of them equally.”229 
The principle of actualization lies in intentionality for “man’s intention to 
complete any action holds him responsible for his deeds.”230 The resulting blame or merit 
which a person gains from that intentionality does not undermine God’s justice in this 
system, for divine justice is seen as a matter of faith.231 The ability to know good and evil 
are a function of divine revelation and so the believer is one who has access to that 
knowledge. “Al-Ashari argues that by approving of these latter (voluntary) actions, which 
God created in us, we ‘acquire’ them and are thus held responsible for them.”232 
Ibn Sina offers some insight on this idea of intentionality for he explains that 
human beings “perceive themselves to be choosing freely for their own purposes even 
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though they are fully determined by external causes.”233 To this end he sees that the soul 
is necessitated in the form of one who chooses freely stating that “its movements are also 
subject to subjection like natural movement. It depends on purposes and motives, and it is 
subjected to them, except that the difference between it and natural [movements] is that it 
perceives its purposes, and nature does not perceive its purposes.”234 It is interesting that 
this notion of the perception of freedom will also come up again in the following section 
on science where humans attribute freedom to their actions even if they are not 
intentional. 
Some commentators on the Asharite school, like Al-Ghazali, assert that secondary 
causality is possible in this system of divine causes.235 He writes that the human being is 
compelled to choose freely: “his being compelled is that all [of his acts] occur in him 
from outside of him, not from him . . . [and] his freely choosing is that he is a substrate 
for a will which originates in him.”236 Yet, as we have seen in the Thomistic notion of 
secondary causality, the divine causes are not on the same level as the human cause; the 
divine cause must be considered on a transcendent level and does not diminish the free 
actions of people. In that way, it would be difficult to comprehend an application of 
secondary causality, as we understand it, to be coherent in this system; for God puts 
actions into existence in each particular person and the person acquires those actions as a 
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function of the creative power of God. Seemingly, in that way human volition is 
undermined because the creative power of God is no longer held to a transcendent level 
and rather seemingly, the Divine cause takes in place in and through human subjects 
replacing their own volition.  
But to end there would be a disservice to the work of Al-Ghazali and a 
misunderstanding of the Asharite doctrine, for Burrell notes that the metaphysical 
background which Al-Ghazali was operative in was the hadith asserting “that God creates 
humanity in God’s own image. That assertion introduces an implicit metaphysics of 
participation, as we have seen and so removes him from the camp of those for whom 
“God can do whatever God wants.””237 In that, Al-Ghazali is operating in the same 
cosmology as Aquinas, Burrell terms this as the “metaphysics of Love”238 So to 
understand the nuance between secondary causality in Aquinas and that of Al-Ghazali, 
Burrell notes that we should consider the notion of kasb or the appropriation of “human 
contribution”239 to action. Burrell notes that term helps us to differentiate “between the 
human contribution and God’s: “God creates the act, man acquires it;” in other words, 
“the act is the act of God insofar as God creates it and the is the act of man insofar as one 
acquires it.””240 In this manner Burrell offers the nuance of the Ashari doctrine “God is 
an agent unlike any we know in that God alone can create an act which is not God’s act 
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but belongs to another. Only the power to create can give that “distance” to an agent.”241 
In this way then we can acknowledge the similarity between what Aquinas is attempting 
to do in secondary causality and what the Asharari school is attempting to accomplish in 
kasb so that there is an “agency proper to humans whose free actions are ipso facto their 
own and an agency proper to God, who can also create actions which properly belong to 
God’s creatures, since creating is the act which is the source of all activity.”242 
Moreover, for Al-Ghazali is not possible for one to discover the possibilities of 
their own freedom without drawing close to God in what Burrell terms as “the program 
of Ihya’”243 or the living of the faith. In this way, through a pious recitation of the name 
of God, thikr and an active life of virtue, a person not only discovers their own 
potentialities and true freedom, more over one also develops “dhawq or taste of things 
divine, which is self-authenticating because it implies the presence of the real world of 
the malakut (or kingdom of God).”244 In this manner we have come to see that Al-Ghazali 
understands human freedom not as something which is extrinsic to the interior life and 
practice of faith, but rather fundamental to it. Here are once again we see the striking 
similarities and overtones to the Christian understanding of spirituality and the life of 
grace which we have seen at length. 
The question remains, why did this Ashari system become so prevalent in the 
Sunni world? Abdul Hafeez Fazali in his essay Islamic view of Omniscience and Human 
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Freedom offers that during the Umayyad rule (661-750) the ruling family suffered the 
brutal murder of their leader Hazrat Hussein and his companions in the year 680. The 
murder of their leader would seemingly cause the downfall of the dynasty, and so, they 
looked for a way of interpreting the death of Hussein in terms of the divine accord. “They 
were in dire need of some sort of a doctrine that could work as defense for them.”245 The 
doctrine of pre-destination was the answer to their prayers; while finding meaning for the 
death of Hussein in the divine cause, it also meant that God had desired for the 
Umayyads to remain in power. The political motivation, Fazali suggests became the 
driving force which caused the Asharite doctrine to be adopted and as a result, a severe 
rejection of the Mutazilite conception as heretical throughout the entire dynasty.  
It remains undeniable that the way the Asharite model was understood remained 
fatalistic. Between the assertion of the divine attributes, the literal reading of the Quranic 
scripture and the lack of freewill of humanity; the model as it was understood left no 
room for any cause in the world other than God. In our contemporary context, the 
Muslim scholar Mohammad Shahrur is one who has sought to bring back human 
causality to a healthy understanding, away from the Asharite view of causality. We began 
our discussion on qadar by explaining the related term qada’ and while more and more 
the two terms became regarded as synonymous in expressing the notion of 
‘predestination’ which humanity must accept submissively. Shahrur desires to revise the 
conflation between the two terms allowing qada’ to “refer to decisions that are taken, or 
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‘determined’, by human beings.”246 In this qadar characterizes God’s laws in the 
objective reality of the universe while qada’ symbolizes the existence of free will in 
human activities in this world. This concept finds is scriptural root in the passage: “Thy 
Lord has decreed [qada] that you worship none but Him, and that you be kind to parents. 
Whether one or both of them attain old age in your life, say not to them a word of 
contempt, nor repel them, but address them in terms of honour.”247 Here the decree of 
God is not one which is causal in the sense of undermining human agency, and rather 
instructive on how to behave. 
He notes that the conflation between qadar and qada’  can be attributed to “the 
big error that we find in Ibn ‘Arabi’s Fusus Al-Hikam where the author announced a 
‘unity of worship’, implying that since God had decreed (qada’) to ‘worship none but 
Him’, humans are predestined to do exactly that in whatever manner and regardless of 
their individual intentions.”248 By asserting the decree of God as qada’ and not qadar 
human free will is undermined. As a result, Shahrur concludes: 
(t)he rules of Islam became an inescapable fate—heedless of what someone 
actually intended to believe or practice—a determined destiny that releases 
people from being responsible and in charge of their religious and ethical 
deeds. Because of Ibn ‘Arabi’s huge influence the verb qada’ was seen as 
synonymous with qadara, and this has had a disastrous effect on the Arab-
Muslim mind.249 
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Chapter 4: Scientific Determinism 
While for centuries the spotlight had been on questions surrounding human 
freedom in the religious context, namely explaining human freedom considering the 
divine attributes and divine causality; contemporary concerns have been dealing with 
similar issues in light of the categories of natural science and the dilemma of material 
reductionism as we explained in the introduction.  Through the influence of a Newtonian 
worldview, human actions are seen as having been brought about anteceding causes “in 
such a way that the action must follow, given the antecedent conditions. These 
assumptions are, according to some philosophers, incompatible with human freedom.”250 
In this section, we will analyze two such trends which have led to the conundrum of 
determinism in the scientific realm. The first portion looks at this trend found in the work 
of Charles Darwin and the resulting genetic determinism which is professed by neo-
Darwinism and the second in the realm of neuroscience, with the work of Benjamin 
Libet. In the end, I will try to look at why these considerations of causality in the 
scientific realm are so difficult to conclude by looking at the work of Alicia Juarrero.  
Materialism and the Dilemma of Determinism 
John Searle, one of the great philosophical thinkers of our time offered that "there 
is a sense in which materialism is the religion of our time."251 By this assertion, Searle 
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warns that materialism and the philosophical implications of such a worldview lead us to 
the proverbial bottom line that all there is moving molecules. We will also see how it is 
that when an action comes about due to the movement of its constituent parts in the 
natural world, one cannot truly attribute an action to the self, instead only to antecedent 
conditions. In this way, many materialists not only dabble with the dilemma of 
determinism but also, they fiddle with the factor of fatalism where "our deliberations and 
decisions are causally ineffective and make no difference to the course of events.”252  
While considering the topic of fatalism in the theological realm, we consider the 
idea of determinism in the scientific realm. The fundamental difference between the two 
is a matter of time essentially. As we differentiated earlier on, determinism speaks about 
causation up until the current moment or action; while fatalism speaks about both past 
and future things as being determined. The philosopher Richard Holton writes that 
“people tend to move from a belief in determinism to a belief in fatalism and to an 
attitude of resignation; for they may be conflating determinism with predictability.”253 
These ideas of predictability and repeatability are very important to the scientific 
enterprise. Yet, Holton warns that the conflation between the two should not be such a 
nonchalant action, rather he holds “the right response is to distinguish more clearly 
between determinism and predictability.”254 
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Daniel Dennett is one such philosopher who looks at the world and reinterprets 
traditional philosophical categories in terms of materialism. He offers that "the prevailing 
wisdom, variously expressed and argued for, is materialism: there is only one sort of 
stuff, namely matter — the physical stuff of physics, chemistry, and physiology — and 
the mind is somehow nothing but a physical phenomenon."255 By looking at the natural 
world as being devoid of all metaphysical properties, the materialist seeks to account for 
every phenomenon by using the same physical principles, laws, and raw materials in a 
manner which is always predictable (within a certain amount of error) and always 
accountable.  
Further, materialists view everything else not pertaining to the material world, 
including our spiritual, mental and conscious life, as illusory. The whole discipline of 
neuroscience attempts to link or associate the activity of nerve cells with consciousness, 
as we will see later in this chapter. To this end, materialists like Dennett reinterpret the 
work of classical philosophers who account for immaterial qualities in the world; offering 
similar axioms and conclusions they translate classical works into categories which are in 
line with materialism. The classical work of Descartes on the body and the soul, for 
example, is reinvented by Dennett and others to rid the system of the immaterial. For 
Descartes, the soul’s seat is located in the pineal gland in the brain,256 the locus where 
sensory information comes together and where we derive our sense of consciousness. 
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Seeing that Dennett and other materialists would reject ideas such as the soul and 
consciousness, they hold on the portions of theory which speak of the material. Here, we 
return to the Cartesian division between res cogitans and res extensa which had already 
started paving the way to contemporary determinism. Now, they are simply able to 
exclude the non-material category of res cogitans. In his book Consciousness Explained, 
Dennett offers the following reorganization of the Cartesian ideas: "(l)et's call the idea of 
such a centered locus in the brain Cartesian materialism, since it is the view you arrive at 
when you discard Descartes' dualism but fail to discard the imagery of a central (but 
material) Theater where it "all comes together.""257 
Accepting material portions of classical philosophy, while rejecting their related 
metaphysical counterparts ends up causing significant problems not only philosophically 
but also scientifically. There has been a barrage of issues which have come up due to the 
insistence on a materialist worldview in our contemporary context. Some of the main 
issues include the question of mind/body,258 the field of quantum mechanics and the 
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uncertainty principle of Heisenberg, 259 and the field of cosmology with the idea of the 
Big Bang Theory.260 Clearly, as a result of the ideology of scientism, scientists find it 
exceedingly difficult to address causality and the existence of non-material categories 
such as ideas, imagination, purpose, teleology and the established laws of the universe 
and maybe the biggest of all human freedom. 
Determinism resulting from a materialist reduction has seemingly become the 
standard in empirical world. Science claims, that my sticking to these material categories, 
it keeps mystery out of living systems and keeps scientists on track in their methodology 
by avoiding these non-quantifiable categories. This success has led many scientists and 
philosophers to regard deviations away from determinism as “without base and 
undermining the entire scientific enterprise.”261 In the following chapter, we will see how 
relevant materialism is to the field of Darwinian evolution and how we ended up getting 
to where we got. To this end, Tom Bethell will claim that “if materialism is true, then 
                                                          
259 The uncertainty principle formulated by Werner Heisenberg “asserts that there is a certain limit on the 
accuracy with which position and momentum can be known simultaneously…(As a result of this principle 
Heisenberg declared) the invalidity of the law of causality is definitively proven by quantum mechanics.” 
Dodds, Unlocking Divine Action, 63-65. For further literature see: John Polkinghorne, Quantum Theory: A 
Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); John C. Polkinghorne, Quantum 
World, (London: Penguin Books, 1986); and Nick Herbert, Quantum Reality: Beyond the New Physics 
(Garden City: Doubleday, 1987). 
260 Contemporary physical cosmology sprang forth from Einstein’s Theory of Relativity. The presence of 
such a marvelously life sustaining multiverse coming forth from the probability of chance is what most 
scientists today assert. “It is not surprising that the apparent peculiarities of our universe (famously in terms 
of the apparent fine tuning of the physical constraints sharpen the desire to find an ‘escape clause’ from the 
ominous scene of a world designed for our habitation and understanding. It is hardly surprising, therefore, I 
many scientists believe the best course of action is to appeal to multiverses endlessly generated, with no 
ultimate beginning and without a conceivable end.” Dodds, Unlocking Divine Action, 73 foot note 119. For 
additional literature on Cosmology and Big Bang Theory see: Ian C. Barbour, Religion and Science: 
Historical and Contemporary Issues (San Francisco, CA: Harper Collins, 1997), 124-129; George Ellis, 
Before the Beginning: Cosmology Explained (New York, NY: Boyars/Bowerdean, 1993); and William 
Drees, Beyond the Big Bang: Quantum Cosmologies and God (LaSalle, PA: Open Court, 1990). 
261 Robert Kane, “Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free Will Debates” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Free Will, Kane, ed., 6. 
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something very much like Darwinism must be true.”262 In many ways, these ideas of 
cause and effect, beginning with Darwin, have become the creed to which materialist 
ascribe. 
Darwin & Genetic Determinism 
The fundamental question which Darwin deals with in The Origin of Species has 
to do with whether it was possible or not for one species to have descended from another. 
He points to the considerable variation there is amongst the different species which 
inhabit the earth and the even more significant amount of similarity. He speaks about two 
terms - modification and coadaptation - as the method by which a species becomes 
naturally selected. Natural selection then is the idea that there are "many more individuals 
of each species are born than can possibly survive; and as, consequently, there is a 
frequently recurring struggle for existence."263 In the process of modification, those 
species that have been modified in a way that allows them to survive in a better manner 
than the others, have been naturally selected. Though not having understood much in the 
way of heredity, Darwin offers that those modified characteristics within a species would 
be passed from one generation to the next, through progeny, bringing about an adaptation 
in the species via propagation.   
                                                          
262 Tom Bethell, ""What Is the World Really Like?" Darwinism, Materialism, and How They Relate," 
Evolution News, 2013, accessed August 01, 2018, https://evolutionnews.org/2013/09/what_is_the_wor/. 
263 Dodds, Unlocking Divine Action, 78. 
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These ideas are found and professed in neo-Darwinians,264 but also in the broader 
realm of evolutionary biology, which rejects the notion that what an individual chooses 
can overcome a genetic determinism and the trends of evolution which will end up taking 
species where "it wills.265 The link between biological determinism and Darwin himself 
is not inherently clear at first glance; for in his view of systems there is a large margin for 
the causality of chance266 and randomness in his writings. Yet, this is not to be 
understood in terms which are contradictory to determinism, for he seems to be 
acknowledging that they appear to have no assignable cause, so he speaks of these 
variations in terms of randomness. Asa Gray addresses this idea in his essay entitled 
Natural Selection not inconsistent with Natural Theology, where he offers how Darwin’s 
notion of chance variation is not only understood as ignorance of the true cause but more 
so that variations are due to chance in the sense of the absence of design. To this end he 
states those who interpret Darwin’s findings rend them “incompatible with the idea of 
any manifestation of design in the universe (in) that it denies final causes.” 267 
If we return to the historical time period when Darwin wrote On the Origin of the 
Species, we will find a related work written by his half-cousin, Francis Galton, entitled 
                                                          
264 We defined neo-Darwinism in the introduction of this paper as a hybrid theory which incorporates 
Darwin’s notion of Natural Selection with Mendel’s theory of genetics. All changes or adaptations in this 
new system are attributed to the causality of chance and seen as a part of the stable structure of nature 
within evolutionary biology. 
265 Kelly C. Smith, "Neo-rationalism versus Neo-Darwinism: Integrating Development and Evolution," 
Biology & Philosophy 7, no. 4 (1992): 431, accessed August 01, 2018, doi:10.1007/bf00130061. 
266 “I have hitherto sometimes spoken as if the variations—so common and multiform in organic beings 
under domestication, and in a lesser degree in those in a state of nature—had been due to chance. This, of 
course, is a wholly incorrect expression, but it serves to acknowledge plainly our ignorance of the cause of 
each particular variation.” Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species, 6th ed. (London, England: John R. 
Murray, 1888), 131. 
267 Asa Gray, “Natural Selection not Inconsistent with Natural Theology,” Atlantic Monthly, July, August, 
and October (1860): 32. 
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English men of Science, their nature and their nurture. In it, Galton argued that energetic, 
smart, successful and even aesthetically inclined people were so gifted as a matter of their 
biological makeup.268  This later would be used to develop the dangerous science of 
eugenics where these characteristics would be chosen in people, so as to breed better, 
more superior human beings. What is pertinent about the work of Galton here, is his 
underlying conviction that natural selection was determined exclusively by biological 
heredity. Darwin at a later time seemingly agreed when with these deterministic 
presuppositions when he writes in The Descent of Man “we now know, through the 
admirable labours of Mr. Galton, that genius...tends to be inherited.”269 
It would become exceedingly difficult to separate the work of Darwin from this 
trend of biological determinism, for based on his work, genetic material is seen as 
exerting control over the process of evolution and would thereby lead the physical world, 
directing it into channels of its own choosing. Galton is overtly explicit about the cause 
for his great reverence for the work of Darwin, which stems not only from the scientific 
insight which it provides but moreover because of the "freedom Darwin gives us from 
theological bondage"270 
                                                          
268 “The intent of this book is to supply what may be termed a Natural History of the English Men of 
Science of the present day. It will describe their earlies antecedents, including the hereditary influences, the 
inborn qualities of their mind and body, the causes that first induced them to pursue science, the education 
they received and their opinions on its merits.” Francis Galton, English Men of Science: Their Nature and 
Nurture (London: Macmillan & Co., 1874), 1. 
269 Charles Darwin, On the Descent of Man (New York, NY: D. Appleton &, 1889), 28, accessed August 
01, 2018, http://darwin-online.org.uk/converted/pdf/1889_Descent_F969.pdf. 
270 Karl Pearson, The Life, Letters and Labours of Francis Galton (London, England: Cambridge 
University Press, 1930), 201. 
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When considering classical Darwinism or neo-Darwinism, “scientific 
explanation(s) had come more and more to mean mechanical explanation(s), so much so 
that even reference to ‘naturalistic’ explanation(s) could be intended to connote the 
exclusion of final cause.”271 According to David Griffen in his article Neo-Darwinism 
and its Religious Implications, he holds: “Darwin’s acceptance of this ideal meant that no 
exception could be made for human beings, which implied that “free will. . . fell under 
his ban” because it would introduce “an element of caprice.””272 
When one ascribes to a system which holds to strict determinism, one cannot 
escape the premise that the only possibilities found in a system are those which are 
predictable in nature, or those which stem from chance. Alternative possible courses of 
action simply do not exist, and the evolutionary process cannot produce beings that 
genuinely make free choices. In so many ways, the work of Galton and other geneticists 
seems to take us from one bondage to another, this time, one of biological determinism. 
In the work of Timothy Goldsmith, entitled The Biological Roots of Human 
Nature, he poses the hypothetical question: what sort of an effect would freedom of will 
have on the process of evolution?273 By doing so, he suggests free will as a purely 
                                                          
271 Frederick Gregory, “The Impact of Darwinian Evolution on Protestant Theology,” in God and Nature: 
Historical Essays on the Encounter between Christianity and Science David C. Lindberg and Ronald L. 
Numbers, eds., (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988), 370. 
272 David Griffin, “Neo-Darwinism and its Religious Implications” in Back to Darwin: A Richer Account of 
Evolution, John Cobb, Jr., ed., (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2007), accessed August 01, 2018, 
http://cornea.berkeley.edu/duality/pubs/drg-neodarw&relig-rev3.pdf. 
273 “A second impediment to understanding the role of evolution in human behavior is associated with this 
notion of free will. Evolution, like secular, humanistic philosophies, also calls attention to the emotional as 
well as the rational side of human nature. For some people, evolution raises the specter of that bugaboo 
genetic determinism, and determinism is by definition the antithesis of free will. At the risk of evoking a 
physiologically deterministic metaphor, the association of evolution and human behavior therefore has the 
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biological trait, one that would impose a competitive disadvantage on those that have it. 
The characteristic of free will, if it ever arose, would have soon died out, he argues, 
because being determined or rule-bound would always lead to the same subsequent 
combination of circumstances.274 
Much like a function in mathematical equations, the numbers put in will always 
produce the same results as an output - without variation. In a behavioral context, this 
kind of system is the exact antithesis of behavior controlled by free will. Actions 
resulting from rule-bound systems would be uncaused. Instead, they would be inevitable 
results of prior causes and effects. This is the position determinists hold. However, by 
contrast, maintaining a free will means that a person remains capable of transitioning 
from one state to the next according to actions of the will. Maintaining a free will offers 
that various possibilities may follow whenever there is an act of the will and that there is 
technically no rule that allows one to know what to expect.  
There is, however, a very practical problem with having free will, from an 
evolutionary standpoint. The idea of adaptation presented in natural selection means that 
survival depends on detecting and adapting to the regularities or irregularities of nature. 
Nature seems to be a random phenomenon to us, despite any predictability in it. At the 
same time, things manifest themselves in nature according to rules. When we wake up 
each morning, we do not find that the things of the world have been recombined or 
                                                                                                                                                                             
capacity to raise hackles. How is it that we can speak of the evolution of human behavior without denying 
the existence of free will?” Timothy Goldsmith, The Biological Roots of Human Nature: Forging Links 
Between Evolution and Behavior (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 94. 
274 Cf. Goldsmith, The Biological Roots of Human Nature, 95. 
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rearranged, so that yesterday's learning has become obsolete. Nature at all levels, despite 
its vast complexity, is replete with patterns and we detect these patterns to anticipate the 
future by observing how nature acts. With the passing of time, we become better and 
better at detecting the recurrent patterns in nature to anticipate what happens next. This 
would be precisely the adaptation which would cause naturally selective advantage by 
responding to the world around us.  
The limitations of what we find when we consider the system of neo-Darwinism 
and genetic biology are numerous. The first is a problem of predictability; to return back 
to the work of Richard Holton which we mentioned earlier, we should note that the 
patterns in nature can be deceptive seeing that nature does not present itself in an entirely 
predictable manner.275 Secondly, according to this system, the causality of chance not 
only becomes operative, rather it becomes the hallmark of what is professed: “(p)ure 
chance, absolutely free but blind, at the very root of the stupendous edifice of evolution: 
this central concept of modern biology is no longer one among other possible or even 
conceivable hypotheses. It is today the sole conceivable hypothesis, the only one 
compatible with observed and tested fact.”276 There is such an emphasis placed on chance 
because with chance events you don’t speak about the final cause or teleology towards 
which something is going. Yet Francisco Ayala notes that chance is just one part of the 
evolutionary process: 
                                                          
275 “We should not just reject predictability because it gives a plausible route to resignation. There is a more 
direct argument for thinking that, in a world containing reflective beings like ourselves, predictability must 
be false.” Richard Holton, From Determinism to Resignation and How to Stop It, Mit, 5, accessed August 
01, 2018, http://web.mit.edu/holton/www/pubs/determinism&fatalism.pdf. 
276 Jacques Monod, Chance and Necessity: An Essay on the Natural Philosophy of Modern Biology (New 
York, NY: Vintage Books, 1971), 112-113. 
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 (c)hance is nevertheless, an integral part of the evolutionary process. The 
mutations that yield the hereditary variations available to natural selection arise at 
random, independently of whether they are beneficial or harmful to their carriers. 
But this random process is counteracted by natural selection, which preserved 
what is useful and eliminates the harmful. Without hereditary mutation, evolution 
could not happen because there would be no variations that could be differentially 
conveyed from one to another generation. 277 
The concept of natural selection in effect does not undermine the category of teleology, 
rather it necessitates it. To that end considering evolutionary models solely in light of 
chance would be deficient. Lastly, using these theories which have gone to offer 
explanations as to the great diversity found in nature, this science tells what is happening 
at a microscopic level and how it is seen in the world around us. Yet as we have seen, it is 
exceedingly difficult for us to consider concepts such as human freedom which can only 
be seen at the level of the human person and not at the microscopic level. Attempts to 
consider freedom in this kind of a worldview have been very deceptive: for while the 
laws of nature are seen as prescriptive, a human person with free will is like a system 
which is not bound by rules living in a system (nature) bound by rules.  
Determinism in Neuroscience 
In the current field of Neuroscience,278  there is a trend which rejects 
intentionality by claiming it as a phenomenon which does not go into deliberation prior to 
an action, rather retrospection after the action has taken place and the seeming feeling 
that the said action can be attributed to the self. In the spring of 1964 Hans Helmut 
                                                          
277 Francisco Ayala, “Intelligent Design: The Original Version,” in Theology and Science, 1 (2003): 23-24. 
278 Defined in the introduction as a multidisciplinary branch of biology that combines physiology, anatomy, 
molecular biology, developmental biology, cytology, mathematical modeling and psychology to understand 
the fundamental and emergent properties of neurons and neural circuits. This study seeks to look at the 
complex process of learning, memory, behavior, perception and consciousness as a function of the activity 
of the brain. 
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Kornhuber, a well-acclaimed physician at a research hospital in Freiburg and Lüder 
Deecke, his doctoral student “discussed (their) frustration with the passive brain research 
prevailing worldwide and (their) desire to investigate self-initiated action of the brain and 
the will.”279 Knowing that through electrical impulses the brain sends signals to the body 
bringing about a physical response, they decided to look for movement in brain activity 
in the human subject, related to volitional acts and to take voluntary movement as their 
research paradigm. 
The possibility of studying electrical brain potentials preceding voluntary 
movements became possible with the advent of the electroencephalogram (EEG). 
Kornhuber and Deecke discovered a particular pattern of brain activity preceding actual 
movement by up to 1 second or more. They coined the term Readiness Potential (RP) as 
the measurement of electric signals in the brain working as precursors to movement. In 
the 1980's Benjamin Libet went to study pre-motor potential, after having removed 
constraints on freedom of action where subjects performed a simple flick of the wrist at 
any time they felt an urge to do so. 
In 1983, research was published by a group of scientists headed by Libet who was 
working at our local institution UCSF. Their research published in Brain: A Journal of 
Neurology entitled “Time of Conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral 
activity (readiness-protentional): the unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act” 
measured recordable cerebral activity which precedes a volitional action. They compared 
                                                          
279 Helmut Kornhuber and Luder Deecke, “Readiness for movement – The Bereitschaftspotential-Story” 
Current Contents Life Sciences 33 (1990): 14. 
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the recordable time of cerebral activity with the reportable time of intending to act. By 
taking three measurements from each of the subjects, at each initiated event: the time of 
action, the time of preparation for that action in the brain as measured by EEG and third, 
the awareness of that action as reported by the subjects themselves. 
At first, they obtained data through 6 experimental sessions each session having 
five subjects. In these sessions, the command to action was one which was exterior to the 
subject. In the second series of sessions, the command to act was self-initiated involving 
what we would consider pre-planning. Subjects were asked to flex their wrists at will 
while noting their urge to move by observing a specially adapted clock. While subjects 
were flexing their wrists and noting their urges, Libet and his team used an EEG to record 
the brain activity, especially that in the pre-frontal motor cortex. Test subjects were able 
to distinguish between awareness in wanting to move from awareness of actually moving. 
As predicted, awareness from wanting to move was consistently in advance of awareness 
of actually moving. However, what was surprising was that data showed that the reported 
time of conscious intention to act did not precede the onset of cerebral activity. Instead, a 
readiness potential was measured some 350 milliseconds before participants became 
aware of their intention to act. 
These results, which indicated that intentionality was something that came after 
the beginning of unconscious preparation by the brain, highlighted the point that cerebral 
initiation of voluntary actions begins unconsciously, before having a subjective 
awareness of any decision which had been made. Libet and others touted these results as 
shedding a shadow of doubt upon previously conceived notions regarding the dynamic of 
80 
 
free will. While Libet himself did not ascribe to the complete negation of freedom of will, 
he noted that the conscious will appears some 150 miliseconds before the activation of 
muscles, allowing “enough time in which the conscious function might affect the final 
outcome of the volitional process.”280 Libet would continue to say that the effect of a 
conscious action is not then on initiation of cerebral activity but instead on what he called 
"veto possibility" or the ability of the human person to stop him/her self from doing 
something. To this end, he noted that there was only room for a so-called "free won't" 
where subjects were able to exert a veto of an action which had already been prepared in 
the brain within the interval of 100 to 200 miliseconds before the moment of action. 
These results have brought about a huge number of responses questioning the 
long-standing notions of intentionality and agency. They formulate conclusions about 
how goal pursuit and voluntary action take place in the human mind; without conscious 
awareness and that conscious actions have unconscious origins. "Although people may 
have the feeling that their behavior is the result of their conscious decisions, their goal 
pursuits too are often directed by external sources of which they are not conscious."281 
Classically, the idea in science was that there was some flexibility on the level of 
the human person to set goals and develop intentionality in specific areas; on the mind's 
ability to build and store mental representations of goals. These goal representations 
would then function as beacons for behavior, motivating action and guiding its course. 
                                                          
280 Benjamin Libet “Neuroscience and Free Will” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Kane, ed., 556. 
281 Ruud Custers and Henk Aarts, “The Unconscious Will: How the Pursuit of Goals Operates Outside of 
Conscious Awareness” Science 329, no. 5987 (2010): 47. 
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Due to this study and others in the field, the classical ideas of intentionality, human 
agency and consciousness have been brought into question so that the processes involved 
in goal pursuit have been reduced down to a few electrochemical actions in the brain with 
input from the perceptual, sensory and motor activities of the body where "the mere 
activation of the idea of a behavior act or outcomes moves and programs the human body 
without a conscious decision to act."282 In that the idea of intentionality is seemingly 
undermined; conscious deliberation and the basis of human freedom, as we discussed it in 
chapter one, has seemingly become a notion that can be applied only after the initiation of 
an action has taken place and seemingly allows us to do no more than to veto an action in 
act of “free won’t”. To this end, Guenther Stent notes: 
(While) it ought to be feasible to ascertain by neurobiological studies of the 
human brain whether peoples' will is subject to the natural laws of causal 
determination, or whether, by any chance, it happens to be independent of them. 
Thus far, neurobiological studies of the brain leave no doubt that its overall 
function, just as the overall function of the rest of the human body, is governed by 
the laws of physics and chemistry. But these studies have not yet managed to 
fathom in detail the mechanisms of many important mental phenomena (including 
willing).283 
The question we must now ask is, are we coming to the right conclusion when we reduce 
the volitional process in this way? Can we safely say that goals are initiated 
unconsciously and that free will as we know it (as the process of contemplation and 
intentionality which leads to a deliberate action) is undermined? Can we discount human 
agency at the flick of a wrist? 
                                                          
282 Custers and Aarts, “The Unconscious Will,” 49. 
283 Stent, “Paradoxes of Free Will,” 12. 
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Juarrero’s Blink and Wink Argument 
To address some of the questions posed above, and to help us correlate some of 
the scientific and theological categories, we will turn to the work of Alicia Juarrero who 
in the introduction to her work Dynamics in Action, addresses the question of 
intentionality by posing the question: was it a blink or a wink? By doing so, she helps to 
shed some light on the underlying question of intentionality where she notes that while 
“we are not responsible and cannot be held accountable for blinking…winking on the 
other hand, is something we “do”.”284 By distinguishing between intentional and 
unintentional actions, she looks at the person as an agent who initiates activities within 
one’s self and which in turn is subject to being qualified as moral or immoral. While 
reflexes are amoral she notes, it is necessary for us to know the difference between action 
and non-action, a topic found in the philosophical realm of action theory. This study takes 
into consideration not only responsibility as stated above, but also awareness of that 
responsibility. This is the aspect of her work in which we find particular interest. 
She points out the how convoluted the problems of intentionality and causality are 
because whether in the realm of science or philosophy "the same body and the same 
neurological system are involved whether I wink or blink."285 To this end, not only does 
she take time to highlight Aristotle’s  four  causes: final  cause  (the  goal  or  purpose 
toward which something aims), formal cause (that which makes anything that sort of 
thing and no other), material cause (the stuff out of which it is made),  and  efficient  
                                                          
284 Alicia Juarrero, Dynamics in Action: Intentional Behavior as a Complex System (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1999), 1. 
285 Ibid., 15. 
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cause  (the  force  that  brings  the  thing  into  being) but she also focuses on the 
immanent premise that nothing,  can  move,  cause,  or  act  on itself in the same 
respect.286 She further notes that contemporary causal theories of action have consistently 
adhered to Aristotle’s axiom and to this end, “intentions, volitions, and other alleged 
causes of action are supposed to be other than the behavior they cause.”287  Going beyond 
Aristotle, she notes that the Newtonian understanding of the efficient cause, somewhat 
haphazardly assumes that intentions, volitions, or agents cause actions to flow in linear 
fashions, or as she puts it, the way that pool cue causes a cue ball to move.  
With the passage of time, the manner in which Philosophy has considered 
causality has not gotten any more mature. She notes that even in a modern philosophical 
understanding of causality:  
there is no reason to continue to subscribe to (an) atemporal and acontextual approach. 
The conceptual framework of the theory of complex adaptive systems can serve as a 
“theory-constitutive metaphor” that permits a reconceptualization of cause, and in 
consequence a rethinking of action. A different logic of explanation—one more suitable 
to all historical, contextually embedded processes, including action—arises from of this 
radical revision.288 
In this, she proposes that action theories take a dynamic approach by considering 
intentional behavior as a complex system. When we cannot easily point out the difference 
between a wink and a blink, we should consider that there is a lot more to it than we 
make it out to be. In that light, Juarrero calls us to be cautious of the interpretations and 
                                                          
286 "So it is clear that in all these cases the thing does not move itself, but it contains within itself the source 
of motion—not of moving something or of causing motion, but of suffering it." Aristotle, Physics, 8.4; 
255b 29-31. 
287 Alicia Juarrero, “Dynamics in Action: Intentional Behavior as a Complex System” Emergence 2, no. 2 
(2002): 25. 
288 Ibid. 
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considerations which are made resulting from scientific inquiry without any context. 
According to her understanding of scientific interpretation, not only must we take into 
consideration the complexity of the system, the singularity of the organs producing the 
same effect but also the intentionality behind it all: 
Narrative, interpretive, and historical explanations of action thus require an expanded 
appreciation of what counts as “reason” and “explanation,” for they explain, not by 
subsuming an explanation under a generalization and thereby predicting it, as modern 
philosophy would require, but rather by providing insight into and understanding of what 
actually happened. They do so by supplying a rich description of the precise, detailed 
path that the agent took, including the temporal and spatial dynamics (both physical and 
cultural) in which the agent was embedded and in which the action occurred.289 
 
While not offering to us an understanding of human subjectivity, Juarrero seems to be 
doing to the important work of reminding us that when we speak about the world and the 
living processes in it, we cannot adopt reductionist models and still come to a complete 
understanding. Rather, we must adapt theories where "the meaning of a complete text is 
constructed from the relationships among the individual passages"290 and where results 
are interpreted, "not by subsuming an explanation under a generalization and thereby 
predicting it… but rather by providing insight into an understanding of what actually 
happened."291 Rather than adopting the reductionist model which according to Juarrero is 
not sufficient to explain the complexities of what happens in the living systems, she notes 
that the human person remains free by virtue of the sheer number of the nexus of 
dimensions of action and operations at work. “In humans, there emerges both the 
                                                          
289 Ibid., 28. 
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remarkable capacity for self-awareness and the sophisticated ability to think of, describe, 
judge, and act in terms of the meaningfulness of our choices…(t)he astounding number of 
dimensions provides a second sense in which human beings are free.”292 
Conclusion 
 The assertions which Origen and Aquinas have made in regards to personal 
agency are very pertinent to help us rediscover not only a healthy conception of divine 
causality but also offer a response to many of the obstacles which we have seen in this 
paper which come from modern science. The ideas of the justice of God which we have 
highlighted help us to understand that as creatures endowed with an ability to act in a 
certain way we are not only responsible for our actions but more importantly that our 
actions are rooted in an ability to cooperate with the divine will. This concept of 
cooperation helps us to regain an understanding that the divine cause is not one which 
works against us; rather it enlightens our mind, it strengthens our resolve to do good and 
it allows us to work towards perfection. To bring the ideas of how the divine attributes 
are operative in the world, allow us to offer some conclusions on omniscience and 
omnipotence.   
Divine Omniscience 
Of all the divine attributes, we have seen how it is that omniscience presented a 
threat to human freedom in that “if God knows the entire future in a way that cannot be 
mistaken, then it looks as if nothing can happen differently that it does. If so, and if 
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human freedom requires the ability to do otherwise, it appears that we are not free.”293 
Aquinas will build upon the work of Origen to note that we cannot consider the 
knowledge of God without considering the divine will.294 was going to explain 
omniscience. In this light, a good and thorough definition of divine omniscience is found 
here: 
God is omniscient or possesses the most perfect knowledge of all things, (which) follows 
from His infinite perfection. In the first place He knows and comprehends Himself fully 
and adequately, and in the next place He knows all created objects and comprehends their 
finite and contingent mode of being. Hence, He knows them individually or singularly in 
their finite multiplicity, knows everything possible as well as actual; knows what is bad 
as well as what is good. Everything, in a word, which to our finite minds signifies 
perfection and completeness of knowledge may be predicated of Divine omniscience, and 
it is further to be observed that it is on Himself alone that God depends for His 
knowledge. To make Him in any way dependent on creatures for knowledge of created 
objects would destroy His infinite perfection and supremacy.295 
We have seen that in looking back from the current moment and considering the 
foreknowledge of God, it is seemingly difficult for us to get away from the idea of how it 
is that anything can happen differently than how God had already known it to be. This 
prior knowledge makes it seem that because God already knew that something would 
happen and presumably how it would come to be, it would be exceedingly difficult for us 
to claim that we are truly free in our own actions. At face value, if we consider that the 
                                                          
293 Linda Zagzebski, “Recent work on Divine Foreknowledge and Freewill” in The Oxford Handbook, 
Kane, ed., 45. 
294 “Aquinas cites Origen, who had claimed that God knows future events because they are future and not 
that they are future because he foreknows them. In response to this, Aquinas says: 'Origen spoke in 
reference to that aspect of knowledge to which the idea of causality does not belong unless the will is 
joined to it.' And this last admission is crucial, for if there are such things as free acts (as defined earlier), 
God's will is not joined to his knowledge in these cases. It may or may not be true, as Aquinas would claim, 
that God's foreknowledge causes certain sorts of future events to occur - viz. those that are also 
predetermined or caused by God’s will.” Stephen Davis, “Divine Omniscience and Human Freedom” 
Religious Studies 15, no. 3 (1979): 314. 
295 Dave Armstrong, "God Is Immutable & Outside of Time (De Fide Dogma)," Patheos, January 04, 2017, 
accessed August 01, 2018, http://www.patheos.com/blogs/davearmstrong/2017/01/god-immutable-outside-
time-de-fide-dogma.html#. 
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knowledge of God is perfect, which is the prerequisite difference between our knowledge 
and God’s knowledge, “humans never have the ability to act other than they do”296 
because God is seemingly always one step ahead by having this prior knowledge.  Both 
Aquinas and the Mutazilites will assert the atemporal nature of God’s knowledge297 as a 
solution to this and in this light the knowledge of God no longer stands in the way of 
personal agency. 
Divine Omnipotence 
While the attribute of omnipotence298 in God is the power: which goes to bring 
about all things in the created and uncreated realms, is eternal and universal, and is 
unlimited and absolute in nature requiring that “nothing happens contrary to the Divine 
will.”299 Regarding the Catholic understanding of omnipotence, it is necessary for us to 
ascribe to belief in God who has the power to do anything and everything, short of evil. 
“Of all the divine attributes, only God’s omnipotence is named in the Creed…(w)e 
believe that his might is universal, for God who created everything also rules everything 
and can do everything.”300 Considering divine omnipotence we look at how it is that 
everything came into being from nothing301 and how it is that it all is sustained. These 
                                                          
296 Kane, The Oxford Handbook, 76. 
297 See footnotes 42 and 196 above. 
298 Regarding the omnipotence of God, the terms providence of God and will of God are also used 
interchangeably in various scholarship. While there is a distinction in the terms, Aquinas asserts that 
providence, pertains primarily to the intellect of God, though it implies also will. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, 
Summa Theologiae, I, q.22, a.1, ad.3 urn.  
299 Ward, Divine Action: Examining God’s Role in an Open and Emergent Universe, 22. 
300 Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd. Ed. (Washington, D.C: United States Catholic Conference, 
2000), 268. 
301 Lateran IV Professed a God: “who by His own omnipotent power at once from the beginning of time 
created each creature from nothing, spiritual, and corporal, namely, angelic and mundane, and finally the 
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ideas are very well developed in Scripture and later scholastic Catholic theology will 
apply reason302 to defend them. 
We have seen a series of difficulties which we encounter when we consider divine 
omnipotence. The issue which holds the place of prevalence is the question of evil and 
suffering in the world, known as theodicy. The question arises: if God is all powerful, 
why does evil exist? By making omnipotence and the existence of evil mutually 
exclusive, you end in a quagmire that goes something like this: “God's omnipotence 
together with His perfect goodness jointly entail that evil does not exist: for if God is 
omnipotent He is able to eliminate all evil, and if He is perfectly good He eliminates as 
much evil as is within His power to eliminate; yet evil exists, so God does not.”303 
While the theodicy question is not something which we will grapple with here, G. 
W. Leibniz in his book304 not only deals with the issue of evil but also with the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
human, constituted as it were, alike of the spirit and the body.” Heinrich Denzinger and Roy Deferrari, The 
Sources of Catholic Dogma (1957), 428. 
302 St Thomas Aquinas will argue for the Omnipotence of God from reason: “Since every agent produces an 
effect similar to itself, to every active power there must correspond as proper object, a category of 
possibilities proportioned to the cause possessing that power, e.g. the power of heating has for its proper 
object that which can be heated. Now Divine Being, which is the basis of Divine power, is infinite, not 
being limited to any category of being but containing within itself the perfection of all being. Consequently, 
all that can be considered as being is contained among the absolute possibilities with respect to which God 
is omnipotent.” Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q.25, a.3. 
From the Documents of Vatican 1 on the Content of our Faith in a section entitled a faith consonant with 
reason: “God has willed that to the internal aids of the Holy Spirit there should be joined external proofs of 
His revelation, namely: divine facts, especially miracles and prophecies which, because they clearly show 
forth the omnipotence and infinite knowledge of God, are most certain signs of a divine revelation, and are 
suited to the intelligence of all.” Heinrich Denzinger and Roy Deferrari, The Sources of Catholic Dogma 
(1957), 1790. 
303 Neal Judisch, "Theological Determinism and the Problem of Evil," Religious Studies 44, no. 2 (2008): 
165, accessed August 01, 2018, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27749947. 
304 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Austin Farrer, Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom 
of Man, and the Origin of Evil (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1985), 58, 2005, accessed August 01, 2018, 
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/17147/17147-h/17147-h.htm.. 
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fundamental difficulties that arise in the notion of an omnipotent God, when considering 
humanity endowed with a free will. He states that at times, we have ascribed to God 
actions which on the one hand maintained his divine power, while on the other 
“renounced the dogma which recognizes God's justice and goodness.”305 As we have 
seen, both Origen and the Mutazilites are adamant about asserting the justice of God as a 
solution. 
It is no easy feat to speak about the dynamic of our own abilities (being that they 
are temporal, limited, sinful) and at the same time still acknowledging the qualities of an 
omnipotent God. St. Thomas Aquinas acknowledges this difficulty of attributing a cause 
to a human agent while regarding omnipotence and omniscience of God in the 
Commentary on Aristotle’s Peri Hermeneias, where he states the problem:  
if Divine Providence is the per se cause of everything that happens in this world, at least 
of good things, it would look as though everything takes place of necessity: first on the 
part of His knowledge, for His knowledge cannot be fallible, and so it would seem that 
what He knows happens necessarily; secondly, on the part of the will, for the will of God 
cannot be inefficacious; it would seem, therefore, that everything He wills happens of 
necessity.306 
Through the mechanism of secondary causality, we have seen how Aquinas offers a 
solution to the conundrum where the divine power of God does not undermine personal 
agency and where the actions of man are attributable completely to God and completely 
to human agent. In this manner Aquinas offers that human volition and divine will are 
compatible with each other. 
                                                          
305 Leibniz and Farrer, Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, 58. 
306 Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Peri Hermeneias, I, 14.17. 
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The compatibility or incompatibility of freedom of will and the type of causality 
in each of these worldviews discussed in chapter 1 (fatalism, determinism, and 
indeterminism) in light of scientific discovery is something which has gained a great 
amount of attention in our contemporary context. While regarding fatalism, it is rather 
easy for us to see that there is no relative freedom in the human agent. Regarding 
indeterminism, the causality of chance makes the categories outside of our deliberative 
choice. However, the real analysis lies in the question of determinism and how it can 
interact with freedom of will. In following, we will go over the main points of 
compatibilism and incompatibilism for our understanding of the free will debate to be 
concluded properly in this paper.  
Compatibilism 
In many ways, determinism is a lot like fatalism where we can say “whatever 
happens must happen”307 due to the necessity of the causes which bring actions into 
being, however, we have seen that the must in fatalism is different from the must in 
determinism. Determinism takes into consideration the ways in which systems work, like 
the laws of nature and like mathematical equations. In determinism those laws are 
operative, and it is accepted that humans do not have the ability to violate those laws. 
However, there are those actions in human volition which do not violate to the laws of 
nature and which still substantiate a change in the natural world. In such cases free will 
                                                          
307 The discussion on Determinism, and its distinction from fatalism is being paraphrased from Mark 
Bernstein, "Fatalism" in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Kane, ed., 101. 
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could conceptually be compatible with determinism, this is the view called 
compatibilism.308  
According to this thought, if one ascribes to determinism to say that things are not 
“up to us” when we can choose from an array of various possibilities, even if only one 
alternative would be possible, it means that determinism does not preclude free will. 
Secondly, the origin or source of our choices and actions is in the agent as such, the 
choice of the agent serves as the antecedent cause of the choice which fulfills the 
requirement for something to be determined. The Scottish philosopher David Hume is 
one of the best-known compatibilists,309 his work can offer us some insight into this 
thought. 
By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the 
determinations of the will; this is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to 
move, we also may. Now, this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to 
everyone who is not a prisoner and in chains.310 
Hume maintains the liberty of a person who chooses to act or not. He explains 
that those choices are caused by the agent's will. For an action to be considered free, the 
agent should consider the question: could I have done otherwise, had I wanted to? In the 
quote, Hume also shows that the lack of an action is the suggestion of freedom in the 
agent. An example of an action which would be considered lacking freedom, for Hume, 
is in the case of the agent who is restrained against his/her own will (i.e., a prisoner in 
                                                          
308 Bernard Berofsky, “Ifs, Cans and Free Will: The Issues” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Kane, 
ed., 181. 
309 Other well-known compatibilists include Thomas Hobbes, John Stuart Mill, and St. Thomas Aquinas. 
310 David Hume and David Hume, "Of Liberty and Necessity," in An Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding (Adelide, Australia: P.F. Collier & Son, 2015), accessed August 01, 2018, 
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chains). This compatibilism is rather practical for in the real world, we are held 
responsible for our actions, and we can determine the causes of the things we have done 
as being proper to ourselves. In short, by explaining the importance of human action, a 
compatibilist makes room for freedom in a world of causes. There is, therefore, no 
incompatibility between an action being causally necessitated and it being a free action 
for which the agent is responsible.311 
Harry Frankfurt is a compatibilist who holds that an agent could be morally 
responsible for things he/she does even when he could not have done otherwise. 312 This 
idea takes into consideration not only end result actions, but our intentionality going into 
that action. In this light, Frankfurt holds that a subject is responsible for things they do if 
it was originally in their intention to do the same thing that they actually did. For him, our 
intentionality stems from "the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in 
the formation of second-order desires.”313 This ability of second-order desire found in the 
human intellect, means that we go beyond “doing” or “not doing” as in Hume, to ask the 
fundamental question which has to do with the internal forum of the person: was what I 
did what I wanted to do or not? He continues: “it is only because a person has volitions of 
the second order that he is capable both of enjoying and of lacking freedom of the 
                                                          
311 Bernard Berofsky, “Ifs, Cans and Free Will: The Issues” The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Kane, ed., 
181. 
312 Cf. Harry G. Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," The Journal of Philosophy 
68, no. 1 (1971), accessed August 01, 2018, doi:10.2307/2024717. 
313 Ibid., 7. 
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will.”314 Responsibility then stems from the intentionality that one has and only 
secondarily to the act chosen. 
Some compatibilists hold that in cases where we are unable to differentiate 
between internal and external causes, rather it is merely necessary for us to say that our 
actions are, more or less free. Just how free we are, depends on a complex matrix of 
internal factors (as we saw with Frankfurt) and how they are influencing us, external 
factors (as we saw with Hume) and how much control they exert on us. In the end, it is 
too tangled a web for us to follow causality to one single point; hence, they would posit 
that we are more or less free. This position, held by the modern philosopher Patricia 
Churchland315 amongst others,316 and is called hypothetical liberty. For her, the “nature of 
self-control and the ways it can be compromised may be a more fruitful avenue”317 than 
looking at internal or external forces on the will. By changing the categories, she opens 
up the possibility of freedom in a natural world and underscores the importance of human 
responsibility.318 
She held that posing the question, "am I free?" is wrong. Rather she posits asking 
the question, "how much control do I have?”. The more control we have, the more 
responsibility we have. This view allows us to incorporate what we know in the 
                                                          
314 Ibid., 14. 
315 Cf. Patricia Churchland, "Do We Have Free Will?" New Scientist 192, no. 2578 (2006): 42-45, accessed 
August 01, 2018, doi:10.1016/s0262-4079(06)61107-x. 
316 Most notably is the philosopher David Hume who is recognized having had provided some of the most 
influential arguments for the compatibilist position in the free will debate. Like, Churchland, Hume holds 
the view that freedom and moral responsibility can be reconciled with determinism. 
317 Churchland, "Do We Have Free Will?," 43. 
318 “I suggest that free will, as traditionally understood, needs modification. Because of its importance in 
society, any description of free will updated to fit what we know about the nervous system must also reflect 
our social need for a working concept of responsibility.” Churchland, "Do We Have Free Will?," 43. 
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deterministic nature of the universe and the subjective experience of freedom which we 
all live. The key to acting freely is then, control. 
Essentially in a Catholic understanding of intentionality, we do not have to reject 
neither the principles of evolution, as we saw in Darwinism, nor the unconscious 
initiation of conscious actions, as we saw in Neuroscience, in order for us to maintain 
freedom of will. Rather, as we have seen throughout this project, Divine causality and 
created causality differ not only in kind but also in degree. Aquinas calls God “the cause 
hidden from every human being”319 as he both transcends all of creation and is 
immanently present in it. In this way, we can say that humanity’s actions reach their 
summit when they are directed towards God. “The effect of divine providence is not only 
that things should happen somehow, but that they should happen either by necessity or by 
contingency. Therefore, whatsoever divine providence ordains to happen infallibly and of 
necessity happens infallibly and of necessity; and that happens from contingency, which 
the divine providence conceives to happen from contingency.”320  
By applying a reductionist system, scientists and the philosophers which base 
their conclusions on them, deviate from what can empirically be demonstrated by 
science. Aquinas and other theologians help us to understand the true context of 
intentionality and human action as being active in both contingent and guided systems. In 
the end, a divine causality must not exclude contingency and emergence. As Aquinas 
                                                          
319 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles III, 101.1. 
320 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q.22,a.4, ad1. 
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offers, the causality of God,321 the first cause, gives to humanity a participation in 
existence and in turn humanity must likewise be subject to divine providence for him to 
find fulfillment in all that is. 
To speak of Divine action, we need not discount the advancement which science 
brings us, rather we must embrace it. However, we must be careful to accept the results 
of the scientific endeavor so long as they too are not pinned within the ideological system 
which discounts God. To this end, Keith Ward offers that “Divine action is, thus, not 
occasional interference in the laws of nature. It is continuous with natural processes, 
present throughout the whole cosmos and entirely compatible with our mathematical 
descriptions of physical behavior – which, accordingly, must be rather looser and more 
flexible than some Newtonian physicists thought.”322 
Origen points to progress in society as being one of the main indications to the 
presence of human agency and the necessity of freedom of will. In our contemporary 
context we seemingly see no contention to this point, for even the staunchest of 
determinists point to what they term as the need for the attribution of “some originative 
value”323 to the unique accomplishments which each person makes to the world. At the 
most fundamental level, both scientists and theologians realize that without any ability to 
attribute actions to the one who accomplished them, not only is progress impossible, our 
existence is in vain. “All that we require is the knowledge that without our presence, the 
                                                          
321 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q.22, a.2. 
322 Dodds, Unlocking Divine Action, 157. 
323 Kane, ed., Oxford handbook of Free Will., 273. 
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universe would have turned out significantly different.”324 This is something we can 
mutually agree on.  
Incompatibilism 
While trying to make the seeming dichotomy of causal determinism and free will 
compatible continues to be a challenging feat, it seems that the notion of their 
incompatibility will be much easier to show. Summarizing325 the issue of the 
incompatibility of determinism and freedom of will, we must return to the two operative 
assertions regarding willful choice. The first is that for an agent to choose he/she must 
have more than one possibility to choose from. The second is that the origin or source of 
an action resulting from a choice must be located in the agent and not something outside 
of him/her. Most of the arguments for the incompatibility of free will and determinism 
are rooted in the first assertion. The consequence argument says that since determinism 
necessitates the presence of antecedent causes, as a consequence it seemingly “is not 
compatible with alternative possibilities.”326  
Peter van Inwagen is a champion of this position, for he holds: 
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events 
in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is 
it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things 
(including our present acts) are not up to us.327 
                                                          
324 Ibid. 
325 I am following the logic of Robert Kane found in the Introduction to the Oxford handbook of Free Will, 
Kane, ed., 10. 
326 Robert Kane, “Introduction” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Kane, ed., 11. 
327 Peter Van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 2000), 16.  
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The consequence argument distinguishes between the past and the present as in cause and 
effect; it can be considered the direction of causation. Unlike in fatalism, the future is 
open whereas the past is fixed and unalterable. However, the difficulty remains in what 
an agent receives as possible choices, for returning to the first assertion, a choice is only 
considered to be free if there are alternative possibilities and causal determinism remains 
as a tricky proposition to be reconciled with. The incompatibilist will then assert “that the 
truth of determinism entails the non-existence of free will: that there is no possible world 
where determinism is true, and someone has free will."328 
Closing remarks 
Returning to Origen. I would like to conclude by asserting his notion of progress which is 
the result of cooperation with the divine will. As we have seen, Origen often critiqued the Greek 
notion surrounding the nature similitude between God and men. “When God created humanity, he 
did not create him the same, rather he gives him the existence of being different and calls them to 
live with his divinity.”329 The ontological difference between the man and his creator not only 
allows for the divinization of man, but moreover it allows humanity to encounter one another in a 
way that is truly human. Origen tells us according to the tradition of Rufinius (in his First Homily 
on Samuel) that humanity by virtue of having a created nature “God calls man into his 
communion.”330  
Communion is established not only in the divine accord, but in the human discovery that 
God desires a humanity which resemble him. “By keeping his commandments (humanity) 
                                                          
328 Kadri Vihvelin, “Compatibilism, Incompatibilism and Impossibilism” in Contemporary Debates in 
Metaphysics, Theodore Seder, et. al., eds. (New York: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 303. 
329 Georgios Lekkas, Liberté Et Progrès Chez Origène (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2002), 59. 
330 Ibid., 60. 
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participates in the same intelligible and common light which is God”331 and in that, they find 
fulfillment in their own actions. As was said previously, Origen held that primitive man was 
created neither totally perfect not totally imperfect.332 The role of God then was brought about “in 
some way because of his (humanity’s) transgression, and was in need of one to perfect him from 
his imperfection.”333 The work of Jesus then is to perfect the imperfection in humanity by 
persuading them through reason to live a life that is upright and to seek the ultimate good.  
Origen will continue on this theme of the development of goodness and progress in the 
spiritual life where he asserts that rational creatures “were endowed with the power of free-will, 
this freedom of will incited each one either to progress by imitation of God or reduced him to 
failure through negligence. And this, as we have already stated, is the cause of the diversity 
among rational creatures, deriving its origin not from the will or judgment of the Creator, but 
from the freedom of the individual will.”334 Freedom of will is not then something which brought 
about the fall, rather it is the gift given to humanity into order for them to progress in their 
participation with God. A person realizes the potential that lies in themselves not only in how 
they were created but rather and more importantly in how they end up. The possibility of 
perfection which was given at the outset of creation is also the goal towards which we strive in 
our efforts towards God. This signifies that the development of the person according to the image 
of God, is not just a natural property which we have passively received, it is rather the goal 
towards which we ought to strive. 
  
                                                          
331 Ibid., 62. 
332 This is found in Origen’s commentary on St. John where he says “the rational creature was not 
altogether imperfect at the time he was placed in paradise” Origen, Commentary on St. John, XIII.239. 
333 Origen, Commentary on St. John, XIII.241. 
334 Origen, De Principiis, 2.9.6. 
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